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SHOULD STATES HAVE GREATER STANDING RIGHTS
THAN ORDINARY CITIZENS?: MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA'S
NEW STANDING TEST FOR STATES
BRADFORD MANK*

ABSTRACT

In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court for the first time
clearly gave greaterstanding rights to states than ordinary citizens.
The Court, however, failed to explain to what extent or when states
are entitled to more lenient standing.This Article concludes that the
Court has historically given states preferential status in federal
courts when a state files a parens patriae suit based on the state's
quasi-sovereigninterest in the health and welfare of its citizens or the
natural resources of its inhabitantsand territory.A quasi-sovereign
interest is inherently less concrete andparticularizedthan the types
of injuries that individual citizens need for standing,yet the Court
has allowed states standing to protect their general interest in their
citizens' health and welfare. This Article proposes that courts relax
the immediacy and redressabilityprongs of the standing test when
states bring parens patriae suits to protect their quasi-sovereign
interest in the health, welfare, and naturalresources of their citizens.
This proposed standingtest would be similar to the relaxed standing
test for procedural rights plaintiffs but is based on the Court's
historicparens patriaedecisions. By using and refining the Court's
procedural rights standing test as a model, this Article proposes a
workable standing test for states.

* James Helmer, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, P.O. Box
210040, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0040; Tel: 513-556-0094; Fax 513556-1236; E-mail: brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank Michael Solimine for his comments and my
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INTRODUCTION

In Massachusetts v. EPA,' the Supreme Court held that carbon
dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) are air pollutants
within the meaning of the Clean Air Act (CAA). 2 The Court
determined that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has a presumptive statutory duty under the Act to issue regulations
for emissions of GHGs from new motor vehicles and remanded the
case so that the EPA can reconsider its denial of a petition to
regulate GHGs from new vehicles.3 Although its decision on the
merits is important, the Court's conclusion that Massachusetts had
standing to file suit because states are entitled to more lenient
standing criteria may have a greater impact in the long-term on
legal doctrine.4 In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court clearly gave,
for the first time, greater standing rights to states than ordinary
citizens.5 The Court, however, failed to explain to what extent or
when states are entitled to more lenient standing. This Article
proposes that courts relax the immediacy and redressability prongs
of the standing test when states bring parens patriae suits to
protect their quasi-sovereign interest in the health, welfare, and
1. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).

2. Id. at 1462. See generally Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000).
3. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1459-60, 1463; Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to
Climate Change Litigation, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 63, 69-70 (2007), available at

http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/adler.pdf;
Dru Stevenson, Special
Solicitude for State Standing Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007).
4. See Adler, supra note 3, at 63-69; Stevenson, supra note 3, at 4-5; Kathryn A. Watts
& Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on Issues Other than

Global Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2), available at
httpJ/www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/17/LRColl2007nl7Watts.pdf ("We
believe that the long-term significance of the case is likely to be the opinion's impact on two
doctrinal areas of the law: (1) the standing of states; and (2) the standard of review applied
to denials of petitions for rulemaking.").
5. See Adler, supranote 3, at 64 ("Although many assumed the Court would focus on the
specific claims of standing put forward by Massachusetts, few expected the Court to announce
a new rule for state standing in lawsuits brought against the federal government.'); see also
Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 304

(2005) ("What the Court has not made clear is whether State AGs who bring parens patriae
public nuisance suits in federal court are subject to the same standing rules as apply to citizen
suits, or whether they are exempt from such limitations by analogy to public actions filed by
public officers in the courts of their own sovereign.").
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natural resources of their citizens.6 This proposed standing test
would be similar to the relaxed standing test for procedural rights
plaintiffs but is based on the Court's historic parens patriae
decisions.7
In Massachusetts, twelve states, with Massachusetts as lead
petitioner, joined other plaintiffs in challenging the EPA's denial of
a petition to regulate GHGs from new vehicle emissions on the
grounds that the EPA lacked authority under the Act to regulate
those gases.8 Before reaching the question of whether the EPA had
statutory authority to regulate GHGs, the Court had to first decide
the difficult issue of whether the petitioners had standing. The
Constitution does not by its terms require that a plaintiff have
standing to file suit in federal court, but since 1944 the Supreme
Court has explicitly imposed standing requirements that it has
inferred from Article III's limitation of judicial decisions to cases
and controversies to ensure that the plaintiff has a genuine interest
and stake in a case.' Because GHGs from vehicles or other sources
6. See infra Part V.
7. See infra Part V.
8. Twelve states were allied as petitioners: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1446 n.2. Ten states intervened on the side of the
EPA: Alaska,Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas,
and Utah. Id. at 1446 n.5. Six states filed briefs as amici curiae in support of the petitioner
states: Arizona, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Stevenson, supra note
3, at 3 n.6.
9. U.S. CONST. art. III (limiting the federal judiciary's power to "cases" or
"controversies"); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,340-42 (2006) (explaining why
the Supreme Court infers that Article III's case or controversy requirement necessitates
standing limitations); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) ("Article
III standing ...
enforces the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement ...."); Stark v.
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 304, 310 (1944) (first Supreme Court case explicitly stating Article III
standing requirements); Ryan Guilds, Comment, A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized
Grievances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1863, 1868 (1996); see
Bradford C. Mank, Standingand Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENvTL.
L. 1, 22 (2005) (noting that since 1944 the Supreme Court has interpreted Article III to
require plaintiffs to satisfy standing criteria). But see Cass R. Sunstein, What's StandingAfter
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168-79 (1992)
(arguing the Framers of the Constitution did not intend that Article III would require
standing). In its 1923 decision, Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Supreme
Court refused to allow a suit by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts under the parens
patriae doctrine to challenge a federal appropriations act because it was a political issue and
thus not judicially cognizable under Article III. Id. at 484-85; see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888-1986, at 184 (1990). The
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have global rather than localized impacts, there are serious
questions about whether any individual has sufficiently unique
harms to justify standing. °
In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens, who was joined by
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, "stress[ed] ... the
special position and interest of Massachusetts."" He stated that "[i]t
is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a
sovereign State and not ... a private individual."12 Justice Stevens
contended that the Court, in its 1907 decision in Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co.,' 3 "recognized that States are not normal
litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction."'4 In
Tennessee Copper and several other cases, the Court recognized a
special standing doctrine of parens patriae standing to allow states
to protect certain quasi-sovereign interests including the health,
welfare, or natural resources of their citizens. 5 Just as Georgia had
a right to invoke federal jurisdiction to protect its quasi-sovereign
interest in protecting the health of its citizens from air pollution
emanating from another state, Justice Stevens maintained that
"Massachusetts' well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign
territory today" gave it standing to invoke federal jurisdiction. 6
In light of both its statutory right to petition the EPA and
'Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests,"
Justice Stevens concluded that "the Commonwealth is entitled to
Mellon Court also refused to allow taxpayers to challenge the act because
[tihe party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute
is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining
some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.
262 U.S. at 488; see also CURRIE, supra,at 184. Mellon implied standing requirements, but
never explicitly used the term. See CURRIE, supra, at 183-86.
10. See infra Part III.C.3. Compare Mank, supra note 9 (arguing that at least some
individuals have standing to challenge injuries from global warming, but acknowledging that
standing for global phenomena raises complex standing issues), with Blake R. Bertagna,
Comment, "Standing"Up for the Environment: The Ability of Plaintiffs To Establish Legal
Standing To Redress Injuries Caused by Global Warming, 2006 BYU L. REV. 415, 444-46
(arguing that plaintiffs asserting global warming claims fail to meet standing requirements).
11. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454.
12. Id.
13. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
14. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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special solicitude in our standing analysis."1 7 Because only one
petitioner needed to have standing for the case to go forward on
the merits, the Court concluded that the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts' allegations that increasing levels of GHGs from
vehicles were causing rising sea levels that were damaging its
coastline was sufficient to meet standing requirements. 8 The Court
did not clearly explain whether Massachusetts could have met
normal standing criteria or needed to rely on the special standing
criteria for states. 19
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts, who was joined
by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, criticized the majority for
relaxing standing requirements for states because he argued that
there was no basis in the Court's precedent for applying a more
lenient standard for states.2" He maintained that, in Tennessee
Copper the Court treated states differently from private individuals
with regard to available remedies, but that the case did not address
Article III standing.2 Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the
Court had recognized the doctrine of parens patriae standing to
permit states to protect certain quasi-sovereign interests, but he
contended that this type of standing requires a state to prove the
additional requirement of having a quasi-sovereign interest and
still requires the state to show that its citizens meet Article III
standing.2 2 He argued that Massachusetts was not asserting a
quasi-sovereign interest, but rather a "nonsovereign interest" as the
owner of coastal property.2 3 Further, he claimed that parens patriae
standing is not allowed against the federal government.2 4
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts contended that the majority applied
a relaxed standing analysis because Massachusetts could not meet
the three requirements for Article III standing: (1) injury in fact, (2)
causation, and (3) redressability. 25 He was especially concerned that
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
Snapp
24.
25.

Id.
See id. at 1453-58.
See infra Part III.C.3.
Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1464 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 1465.
See id. at 1465-66. But see infra Parts III.B-C.
See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Alfred L.
& Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982)).
See id.
Id. at 1466-67.
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the majority weakened precedent concerning causation and redressability." He accused the majority of adopting weakened
standing criteria that inappropriately allowed federal courts to hear
complex policy disputes more appropriately addressed by the
political branches of government.2 7
This Article concludes that the Court has historically given states
preferential status in federal courts when a state files a parens
patriae suit based on the state's quasi-sovereign interest in the
health and welfare of its citizens or the natural resources of its
inhabitants and territory.2 8 There are sound reasons to apply lesser
standing requirements to enable states to protect their quasisovereign interest in the health and welfare of their citizens or the
natural resources of their inhabitants and territory. Chief Justice
Roberts' dissenting opinion is correct on many details, but fails to
understand that the theoretical grounds for parens patriae standing
also support a more relaxed standing test for states. 29 A quasisovereign interest is inherently less concrete and particularized30
than the type of injuries that individual citizens need for standing,
yet the Court has allowed states standing to protect their general
interest in their citizens' health and welfare.3 1 Although it is not
technically a standing case, Tennessee Copper is based on the
fundamental distinction that states have different and greater
rights than individual citizens.3 ' Thus, the Massachusetts majority
correctly used the Court's parens patriae decisions as the basis for
giving states preferential access to federal courts even though none
of the parens patriae cases explicitly applied a lower standing
threshold for states.
See id. at 1468-70; Adler, supra note 3, at 66, 69.
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1464, 1470-71.
See infra Part IV.G.
See infra notes 349-52 and accompanying text.
For standing in an Article III court, the Court currently requires a plaintiff to show:
(1) [she] has suffered "an injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000).
31. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907).
32. Id.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
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The most serious weakness of the majority opinion is that it fails
to define to what extent and under what circumstances federal
courts should relax standing requirements for states.3 3 The Court
currently relaxes the immediacy and redressability portions of the
standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs. 34 The Tennessee
Copper decision and other parens patriae cases justify a similar
relaxation of the immediacy and redressability requirements for
states filing parens patriae suits. 35 By using and refining the Court's
procedural rights standing test as a model, this Article proposes a
workable standing test for states.
Part I provides a brief overview of standing. Part II discusses the
court of appeals' decision in Massachusetts. Part III examines
Justice Stevens' majority opinion and Chief Justice Roberts'
dissenting opinion in Massachusetts. Part IV explores the Court's
parens patriae decisions and concludes that they support the
Massachusettsdecision in lowering standing barriers for states. Part
V proposes a new test for states that relaxes the normal immediacy
and redressability requirements. Part VI examines the policy
implications for giving states and especially state attorneys general
greater standing rights than ordinary citizens.

I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO STANDING
A. ConstitutionalStanding
Part I will provide only a brief overview of
the court of appeals' decision and the Supreme
Massachusetts discuss standing requirements
Standing doctrine defines "the characteristics a
juridical entity must possess to bring a suit. '3
ments ensure that "a matter before the federal

standing because
Court opinions in
at great length.
person or another
Standing requirecourts is a proper

33. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1466 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("It
is not at all clear how the Court's 'special solicitude' for Massachusetts plays out in the
standing analysis, except as an implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish standing
on traditional terms.").
34. See infra Part I.C.
35. See infra Part II.
36. Michael E. Solimine, RecalibratingJusticiabilityin Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
531, 533 (2004).
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case or controversy under Article III" and that the "Federal
Judiciary respects 'the proper-and properly limited-role of the
courts in a democratic society."'3 7 The federal courts have
jurisdiction over a case only if at least one plaintiff can prove that
it has standing for each form of relief sought.3" A federal court must
dismiss a case without deciding the merits if the plaintiff fails to
meet the constitutional standing test.3 9
For standing in an Article III court, the Court presently requires
a plaintiff to show:
(1) [she] has suffered "an injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.4 °
the burden of establishing all three prongs of the
A plaintiff has
41
standing test.
B. Generalized Injuries
In cases involving generalized, abstract injuries that affect the
public as a whole, especially cases involving alleged misuse of
taxpayer funds,4 2 the Supreme Court has sometimes stated that
37. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
38. See id. at 351-53; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 185 (2000) ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each form of relief sought.").
39. See DaimlerChrysler,547 U.S. at 340-41; Friendsof the Earth,528 U.S. at 180 ("[W]e
have an obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the outset
of the litigation."); Mank, supra note 9, at 23.
40. Friendsof the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-81 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); see also Mank, supra note 9, at 23-24.
41. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 (stating that parties asserting federal
jurisdiction must "carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article ir'); Lujan,
504 U.S. at 561; Mank, supra note 9, at 24.
42. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (holding that
taxpayers do not have standing to challenge the White House program on federal aid to faithbased organizations and limiting taxpayer challenges under the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause to congressional legislation benefiting religion); DaimlerChrysler,547
U.S. at 342-46 (denying standing in a state taxpayer suit in part because plaintiffs' alleged
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such injuries are more appropriately remedied by the political
branches than the judiciary pursuant to the separation of powers
doctrine.4 3 In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc.," the Supreme Court stated that "we have declined to
grant standing where the harm asserted amounts only to a
generalized grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a
substantially equal measure" because such suits raised "general
prudential concerns 'about the proper-and properly limited-role
of the courts in a democratic society."'4 5 In Gladstone Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood," the Court explained that the generalized
grievance doctrine enables "the judiciary ...to avoid deciding
questions of broad social import where no individual rights would
be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those
litigants best suited to assert a particular claim."4 Additionally, the
generalized grievance doctrine assists courts in avoiding broader
remedies than that "required by the precise facts to which the
court's ruling would be applied."4 8
There are serious problems with the Court's decisions discussing
the issue of generalized grievances and standing.4 9 Before 1998, the
injuries were common to the public at large and stating that federal taxpayers generally lack
standing unless suit is based on the Constitution's Establishment Clause). But see Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) (holding that a federal taxpayer had standing to challenge
spending allegedly in violation of the Constitution's Establishment Clause because "the
Establishment Clause ...
specifically limit[s] the taxing and spending power conferred by Art.

I, § 8").
43. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 575-77 (requiring "particularized" injury and stating that
the Constitution assigns the political branches of government the responsibility for addressing
grievances affecting the public at large); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 221 n.10 (1974) (stating that the judicial role of deciding cases involving
particularized injuries "is in sharp contrast to the political processes in which the Congress
can initiate inquiry and action, define issues and objectives, and exercise virtually unlimited
power by way of hearings and reports, thus making a record for plenary consideration and
solutions. The legislative function is inherently general rather than particular and is not
intended to be responsive to adversaries asserting specific claims or interests peculiar to
themselves."); Kimberly Breedon, Remedial Problems at the Intersection of the Political
Question Doctrine, Standing and Equitable Discretion, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2008); Mank, supranote 9, at 21-22.
44. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
45. Id. at 80 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
46. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
47. Id. at 99-100.
48. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 222.
49. See generally Guilds, supra note 9, at 1876-85.
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Court's generalized grievance decisions did not clearly explain
whether the doctrine is a prudential limitation that Congress can
override to allow such suits,5 ° or whether it is a mandatory
constitutional doctrine.5 1 The Lujan Court's requirement under
Article III that a plaintiff demonstrate a particularized injury
arguably requires that a plaintiff establish that its injury is
different from the public at large, but the Court also suggested that
victims of mass tort are entitled to sue.5 2 Before 1998, the Court did
50. In addition to the three-part test for constitutional Article III standing suits, courts
can impose policy-based prudential limits on standing, for example, by requiring a suit to be
within the "zone of interests" of the relevant statute, prohibiting third-party suits, or
restricting suits asserting generalized grievances. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
162-63 (1997) (describing the "zone of interests" standard as a "prudential limitation" rather
than a mandatory constitutional requirement); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
561-62 (1992) (stating that a court may reject standing if plaintiff is asserting the rights of a
third-party not before the court); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59, 80 (1978) (stating that a court may deny standing if a suit would raise "general
prudential concerns 'about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society.' Thus, we have declined to grant standing where the harm asserted
amounts only to a generalized grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a
substantially equal measure." (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498) (citations omitted)); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) (stating that prudential requirements are based "in policy,
rather than purely constitutional, considerations"); Guilds, supra note 9, at 1875-76, 1878-80
(noting that it is not always clear whether the Court's reservations about generalized
grievances are a prudential limitation or a constitutional objection); Mank, supra note 9, at
28 (discussing prudential limitations as including restrictions on generalized grievances);
Zachary D. Sakas, Footnotes, Forests, and Fallacy: An Examination of the Circuit Split
Regarding Standing in ProceduralInjury-based ProgrammaticChallenges, 13 U. BALT. J.
ENVTL. L. 175, 179 (2006) (stating that prudential limitations are policy-based). Unlike
constitutional limits on standing, however, Congress may expressly override prudential
limitations by, for example, providing expansive citizen suit provisions that reach the limits
of Article III standing. See, e.g., Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162, 166 (holding that "unlike their
constitutional counterparts, [prudential limits on standing] can be modified or abrogated by
Congress," and concluding that a citizen suit provision abrogated the zone of interest
limitation); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; see also Mank, supra note 9, at 28; Sakas, supra,at 179.
The Clean Air Act contains an express citizen suit provision that allows both citizens and
states to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000).
51. See Guilds, supra note 9, at 1878-84 (discussing confusion over whether the Court's
standing cases prohibiting generalized grievances are constitutional or prudential
limitations); Cass R. Sunstein, InformationalRegulation and InformationalStanding: Akins
and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 643-44 (1999) (arguing that earlier cases implied that
prohibition against generalized grievances was prudential in nature, but that Lujan suggested
that prohibition might be constitutional in nature).
52. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 572-77 (requiring "particularized" injury and stating that
the Constitution assigns the political branches of government the responsibility for addressing
grievances affecting the public at large, but also implying that plaintiffs who have concrete
injuries from a mass tort or mass fraud have standing to sue); Guilds, supranote 9, at 1881-84
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not provide a clear definition of which types of injuries are
particularized enough for judicial redress, and which injuries are too
general for judicial relief.53 For example, the Court suggested that
victims of mass torts are eligible for standing because each has his
own unique personal injuries even if large numbers of people share
similar injuries, but certain language in some of its decisions also
suggested that if all members of the public received the same type
of injury then there is no judicial redress.5 4
In its 1998 decision, Federal Election Commission v. Akins
(Akins), the Court clarified which types of mass or general injuries
are appropriate for judicial redress.55 The Court granted standing
to voters who requested information from the Federal Election
Commission, even though the plaintiffs were similarly situated to
other voters, because the statute at issue overcame any prudential
limitations against generalized grievances.56 The Court explained
that it would deny standing for widely shared, generalized injuries
only if the harm is both widely shared and "of an abstract and
indefinite nature-for example, harm to the 'common concern for
obedience to law."'5 7 The Akins Court stated that its prior decisions
(discussing whether the Lujan decision established a constitutional prohibition against
generalized grievances).
53. Guilds, supra note 9, at 1884-92 ("Beyond the uncertainty about whether generalized
grievances are constitutional or prudential limitations, there is also uncertainty about their
precise definition.").
54. See id. at 1884-92. CompareLujan, 504 U.S. at 572 (implying that plaintiffs who have
concrete injuries from a mass tort or mass fraud have standing to sue), Warth, 422 U.S. at 501
(holding that a plaintiff may be able to satisfy Article III standing requirements, "even if it
is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants"), and United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973) ("[T]o deny
standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured,
would mean that the most injurious and widespread ... actions could be questioned by
nobody."), with Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 572-77 (requiring "particularized" injury and
stating that the Constitution assigns the political branches of government the responsibility
for addressing grievances affecting the public at large), and Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 80 ("[W]e
have declined to grant standing where the harm asserted amounts only to a generalized
grievance shared by a large number of citizens in a substantially equal measure.").
55. 524 U.S. 11, 21-25 (1998); see David R. Hodas, Standing and Climate Change: Can
Anyone ComplainAbout the Weather?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451,471 (2000) (discussing
Akins); Mank, supra note 9, at 37-40; Sunstein, supra note 51, at 634-36, 644-45.
56. Akins, 524 U.S. at 19-21; see Hodas, supra note 55, at 471; Mank, supra note 9, at 37;
Sunstein, supranote 51, at 634-36, 642-45, 671-75 (discussing Akins and concluding that the
statute at issue overrode any prudential limitations against generalized grievances).
57. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23-25 (quoting L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S.
295, 303 (1940)); see Hodas, supranote 55, at 471-72; Mank, supra note 9, at 37-40 (discussing
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denied standing only if an alleged injury was too abstract, but
approved standing even in cases in which many people suffered the
same injury if the harm was concrete. 8 Justice Breyer's majority
opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, observed that the fact that
"an injury is widely shared ...does not, by itself, automatically
disqualify an interest for Article III purposes. Such an interest,
where sufficiently concrete, may count as an 'injury in fact."'59 The
Akins decision stated that a plaintiff who suffers a concrete actual
injury can normally fulfill the injury in fact requirement even
though many others have suffered similar injuries:
[Tihe fact that a political forum may be more readily available
where an injury is widely shared ...does not, by itself,
automatically disqualify an interest for Article III purposes....
This conclusion seems particularly obvious where (to use a
hypothetical example) large numbers of individuals suffer the
same common-law injury (say, a widespread mass tort), or where
large numbers of voters suffer interference with voting rights
conferred by law. We conclude that, similarly, the informational
injury at issue here, directly related to voting, the most basic of
political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific such that the
fact that it is widely shared does not deprive Congress of
constitutional power to authorize its vindication in the federal
courts. 60
In Pye v. United States,61 the Fourth Circuit summarized Akins as
holding that "[slo long as the plaintiff ...has a concrete and
particularized injury, it does not matter that legions of other
persons have the same injury."6 2
The Akins decision did not settle all questions about when
plaintiffs alleging generalized grievances are entitled to standing.
Akins suggested that the Court's reservations about standing for
Akins); Sunstein, supra note 51, at 634-36.
58. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25; see Mank, supra note 9, at 38; Sunstein, supra note 51, at
636, 644.
59. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (empasis added); see Mank, supra note 9, at 38.
60. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25 (citations omitted); see Hodas, supra note 55, at 472; Mank,
supranote 9, at 38.
61. 269 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2001).

62. Id. at 469.
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generalized grievances are usually prudential limitations that
Congress may override in a statute, but the decision did not
completely eliminate the possibility that Article III, in some circumstances, places constitutional limits on generalized grievances.6"
In his dissenting opinion in Akins, Justice Scalia, who was joined
by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, argued that "undifferentiated"
grievances, "'common to all members of the public' ... must be
pursued by political, rather than judicial, means." 4 He contended
that all generalized grievances that affect the public at large should
be addressed by the political branches even if the injuries are
concrete.65 Under his approach, an injury must be particularized if
it is to be heard in the federal courts.66 In a law review article he
wrote several years before Akins, then-Judge Scalia argued that
separation of powers principles require courts to limit standing to
prevent judicial overreaching into the domain of the political
branches. His Akins dissent follows that approach in contending
that federal courts should never address general grievances because
they are more appropriately the subject of the political branches.6 7
The majority opinion in Massachusetts cited Akins with approval.6 Like Akins, the Massachusetts decision emphasized that
the statute at issue "authorized this type of challenge to EPA action"
to overcome any prudential questions about whether the issue was
too general and better suited for political resolution.69 By contrast,
Chief Justice Roberts did not cite Akins and instead cited cases in
which the Court had warned of the dangers of the federal courts

63. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 637, 643-45, 671-75.
64. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 177 (1974)); see Hodas, supra note 55, at 472-73; Mank, supra note 9, at 39;
Sunstein, supra note 51, at 637, 646-48.
65. Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Hodas, supra note 55, at 473; Mank,
supra note 9, at 39; Sunstein, supra note 51, at 637, 646-48.
66. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 9, at 39; Sunstein,
supra note 51, at 637.
67. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 35-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standingas an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881,
881, 896 (1983); see also Mank, supranote 9, at 29, 38-39 (discussing then-Judge Scalia's law
review article on standing and his subsequent standing opinions as a member of Supreme
Court); Sunstein, supra note 51, at 643-44.
68. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1456 (2007).
69. Id. at 1453 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000)).
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addressing generalized policy issues that are better left to the
political branches of government."v
C. Relaxed Standing in ProceduralRights Cases
The Court has relaxed the immediacy and redressability standing
requirements for procedural rights plaintiffs who could plausibly
suffer a concrete injury in the future.7 In footnote seven of the
Lujan decision, Justice Scalia explained that litigants who may
suffer a concrete injury from a procedural error by the government
are entitled to a more relaxed application of the redressability
and immediacy standing requirements because there is often a
significant time lag between when a procedural error may occur and
when that error might affect the plaintiff. He stated:
There is this much truth to the assertion that "procedural
rights" are special: The person who has been accorded a
procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that
right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one
living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally
licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency's
failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even
though he cannot establish with any certainty that the
statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and
even though the dam will not be completed for many years.7 2
Justice Scalia limited footnote seven standing to plaintiffs who
will suffer concrete injuries if the government builds the dam.
According to footnote seven, a plaintiff living next to a dam has a
potential concrete injury that is real enough to justify standing, but
"persons who live (and propose to live) at the other end of the
country from the dam" do not have "concrete interests affected" and,
therefore, do not have standing to challenge a procedural violation.7 3
70. See id. at 1464-71 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also infra Part III.B.
71. See Mank, supranote 9, at 35.
72. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992); see Cantrell v. City of
Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 682 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing relaxed standing requirements for
procedural injuries); Bertagna, supra note 10, at 457; Mank, supranote 9, at 35-36 n.240.
73. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see also id. at 573 n.8 ("We do not hold that an individual
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In footnote seven of the Lujan decision, Justice Scalia used the
example of a plaintiff requesting, under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA),74 an environmental impact statement (EIS)
studying the potential effects of a proposed dam located near the
plaintiffs home as the classic example of a procedural injury.75
NEPA is a purely procedural statute that requires the government
to examine the environmental consequences of its actions and to
give the public an opportunity to comment on proposed government
projects, but gives the agency the sole authority to decide whether
to build the project. 76 If a plaintiff demonstrates that the
government has failed to adequately examine the environmental
consequences of a proposed project, a judge can order the
government to conduct an environmental assessment or a more
detailed EIS to study the environmental impacts of a proposed
government action, but cannot order the government to take any
substantive action, because the agency has the sole policy-making
discretion to decide whether the value of the proposed action
outweighs any environmental consequences.7 7 Thus, even if a
plaintiff is successful in forcing the government to write an EIS
addressing the environmental impacts of a proposed dam, the
government may still decide to build the dam. Without the relaxed
standards for redressability and immediacy in footnote seven, most
78
NEPA plaintiffs could not establish standing.
cannot enforce procedural rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are
designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his
standing."); William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'y F. 247, 257 (2001).
74. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
75, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see Mank, supra note 9, at 35-36.
76. See National Environmental Policy Act §§ 4321-4370f; see also Sakas, supra note 50,

at 187; Miriam Wolok, Standing for Environmental Groups: ProceduralInjury as Injury-inFact, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163, 182 (1992) ("Generally, the procedural injuries that plaintiffs
allege under NEPA are an increased risk that an agency overlooked environmental
consequences in its decision-making process and the lost opportunity to participate in that
process." (footnotes omitted)).

77. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) ("NEPA
itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process.");
Mank, supranote 9, at 47; Matthew William Nelson, Comment, NEPA and Standing: Halting
the Spread of "Slash-and-Burn"Jurisprudence,31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 253, 257, 279-80 (1997)
('Therefore, while environmental groups can challenge the procedural adequacy of an EIS,

they cannot use the courts to impose or require any particular results.").
78. See Mank, supra note 9, at 36.
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The Lujan case provides little guidance on how to apply footnote
seven, in part because the Court did not actually employ it in that
case.79 In Lujan, the plaintiffs challenged the government's failure
to follow a mandated consultative procedure in the Endangered
Species Act that requires federal agencies to first consult with the
Secretary of Interior to prevent or mitigate any harm before the
agency finances, authorizes, or pursues an action that may harm a
threatened or endangered species or its habitat.8 ° The plaintiffs
failed to establish the immediacy and concreteness portions of the
standing test because neither affiant had immediate plans to return
to visit endangered species in Egypt and Sri Lanka that were
allegedly threatened by foreign construction projects funded in part
by United States agencies; therefore, they could not allege any
concrete harm from the agencies' failure to consult the Secretary
about the endangered species.8 1 Because the plaintiffs lived so far
from the alleged harms and failed to demonstrate an injury in
fact, the Lujan Court did not need to address any hard questions
or implications involving footnote seven. Furthermore, in Lujan,
Justice Scalia's discussion of redressability garnered support from
only a plurality of the Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
White, and Justice Thomas-because Justices Kennedy and Souter
declined to join that portion of the opinion, and thus the decision
does not provide clear guidance on this issue." Although footnote

79. Douglas Sinor, Tenth Circuit Surveys: Environmental Law, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 859,
879 (1998) ("Footnote seven, however, is confusing and raises more questions than it answers,
since the court did not apply the standards it set forth ... because Lujan was not a procedural
rights case. Thus, the lower courts are given the task of interpreting and applying the
standards it set forth." (footnote omitted)).
80. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-59 (discussing Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1536(a)(2) (1988)); Bertagna, supranote 10, at 456.
81. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-64; see also id. at 579-80 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Brian
J. Gatchel, Informationand ProceduralStanding After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 11 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75, 92-94 (1995) (arguing that the plaintiffs in Lujan failed to meet the
immediacy requirement of standing); Mank, supra note 9, at 30-31 (stating that the Lujan
decision found that plaintiffs failed to establish a concrete or imminent injury).
82. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568-71 (Part II-B of the opinion); id. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Buzbee, supranote 73, at 258; Mank, supra note 9, at 32-33; Sunstein, supranote
9, at 206.
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seven is arguably dicta in the Lujan case,8 3 the Massachusetts Court
treated footnote seven as binding precedent.'
A serious weakness of footnote seven is that it does not clearly
explain the degree to which redressability and immediacy requirements for standing are waived or relaxed in procedural rights
cases, the plaintiffs burden of proof to establish standing in a
procedural rights case, or how to define a procedural right.8" In the
dam hypothetical, for example, the immediacy requirement arguably should be eliminated for plaintiffs because they have no control
over how quickly the government will build the dam; but the Court
never expressly addresses that issue.86
The redressability portion of the Lujan opinion only gathered a
plurality and thus is not binding precedent. 7 Additionally, the
Court's plurality opinion on that point implicitly appears to address
normal redressability requirements rather than the relaxed
requirements of footnote seven.8 Footnote seven does not provide
any clear guidelines concerning the extent to which courts are to
relax or eliminate redressability requirements for procedural rights

83. Even though footnote seven was technically dicta in the Lujan case, many
commentators believe that it likely represents the thinking of a majority of the Court because
the dissenters in the case probably agreed with it. See William W. Buzbee, Expanding the
Zone, Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and Article III StandingAnalysis after Bennett v.
Spear, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 763, 808-10 (1997); Mank, supra note 9, at 36 n.241; Sakas, supra
note 50, at 185.
84. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007) (majority opinion); see also
infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
85. See Gatchel, supra note 81, at 99-100 (criticizing footnote seven in Lujan for failing
to explain to what extent the immediacy and redressability standing requirements are relaxed
or eliminated for procedural rights plaintiffs); Mank, supra note 9, at 36 n.244 (criticizing
footnote seven and citing commentators); Sinor, supranote 79, at 879-81; Sunstein, supranote
9, at 208, 225-26; Christopher T. Burt, Comment, ProceduralInjury StandingAfter Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 285 (1995) ("Lujan'sprocedural injury dicta is
not without its problems, however. At best, it is vague and provides little guidance for
prospective plaintiffs and the lower courts ....
").
86. See Gatchel, supranote 81, at 93-94, 99-100; Sinor, supra note 79, at 880.
87. See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 206; see also supra note 82 and accompanying text.
88. See Gatchel, supranote 81, at 95-96, 108 ("Implicitly, Justice Scalia's opinion suggests
that he was applying the regular standard of redressability rather than the relaxed standard
of redressability that a 'person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his
concrete interests' is entitled. Presumably, the Defenders plaintiffs did not receive the relaxed
redressability requirements because they failed to demonstrate the prerequisite injury in fact
sufficiently concrete to violate a procedural right which redressability was designed to
protect.").
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plaintiffs. 9 The simplest solution would be to eliminate redressability requirements for procedural rights plaintiffs who meet
footnote seven requirements rather than to establish a complicated
intermediate redressability test for such plaintiffs;9 ° but it is not
clear whether Lujan intended to eliminate that requirement.
The courts of appeals are divided regarding how to apply footnote
seven to NEPA cases; they disagree about the burden of proof a
plaintiff must meet to demonstrate that she is likely to be harmed
by the agency's action.9 1 As is discussed in Part III, there is also
uncertainty about which cases are procedural rights cases that are
governed by footnote seven, and which are substantive cases in
which the relaxed approach is inapplicable.9 2 Lujan did not provide
a comprehensive definition of a "procedural rights case." Lower
courts have sought to define a "procedural injury,"" but the
Supreme Court has not provided a definitive answer.
89. See id. at 100-06, 108; Sinor, supra note 79, at 880.
90. See Gatchel, supranote 81, at 105-06, 108.
91. Compare Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 666-72 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(applying a strict four-part test for standing in procedural rights cases, including requiring
a procedural rights plaintiff to demonstrate a particularized injury-that there is a
"particularized environmental interest of the plaintiff, and that it is a substantial probability
that the government act ...
will cause that demonstrably increased risk of injury" alleged by
the plaintiff), with Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 972-75
(9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting FloridaAudubon's standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs and
quoting Lujan to explain that such plaintiffs "need only establish 'the reasonable probability
of the challenged action's threat to (their] concrete interest"'), and Comm. to Save the Rio
Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 447-52 (10th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with FloridaAudubon's
"substantial probability" test for procedural rights plaintiffs and instead adopting a test that
plaintiff must establish an "increased risk of adverse environmental consequences" from the
alleged failure to follow NEPA). See Bertagna, supranote 10, at 461-64 (discussing the split
between the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits on the causation portion of the standing
test); Mank, supra note 9, at 45 (discussing the split among circuits about how to apply the
footnote seven standing test in NEPA cases); Sakas, supra note 50, at 192 (noting that in
procedural injury challenges to programmatic rules,"[t]he Ninth and Seventh Circuits have
held that a plaintiff need not have a claim that is site-specific, while the D.C., Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits have created a stricter standing doctrine where a site-specific injury is
necessary").
92. See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
93. See Hodges v. Abraham, 300 F.3d 432,444 (4th Cir. 2002) (defining a procedural right
as "the right to have the Executive observe procedures mandated by law"); Friends of the
Earth v. U.S. Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 1988) (defining procedural injury as applying
to situations where the plaintiff alleges that a statute requires certain procedures be followed
"to ensure that the environmental consequences of a project are adequately evaluated" and
where the responsible agency fails to comply with those procedures); Bertagna, supra note 10,
at 456 n.216.

2008]

NEW STANDING TEST FOR STATES

1721

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS' DIVIDED OPINION IN MASSACHUSETTS
In 1999, a group of nineteen private organizations petitioned the
EPA "to regulate 'greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles under § 202 of the Clean Air Act."'94 After providing for
public comment, on September 8, 2003, the EPA entered an order
denying the rule-making petition.95 The EPA provided two grounds
for its denial of the petition: "(1) that contrary to the opinions of its
former general counsels" issued in 1998 and 1999, "the Clean Air
Act does not authorize EPA to issue mandatory regulations to
address global climate change, and (2) that even if the agency had
the authority to set greenhouse gas emission standards, it would
be unwise to do so at this time."9 A month later, in October 2003,
the petitioners were joined by twelve intervenor states, with
Massachusetts as lead petitioner, in filing suit in the federal D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals to seek review of the denial. 7
The court of appeals, in a divided opinion, denied the petition for
review. Although each of the three judges on the court of appeals
panel wrote a separate opinion, two judges agreed "that the EPA
Administrator properly exercised his discretion under § 202(a)(1) in
denying the petition for rule making."" This Article will focus on the
standing portion of the decision.
To prove that they met standing requirements, the petitioners
filed several affidavits from scientists and property owners that
generally alleged that rising levels of GHGs were causing global
warming that was likely to result in significant damage to state
and private property.99 To specifically address the causation and
redressability prongs of the standing test, the petitioners relied
on two affidavits from a climatologist and an engineer alleging
that reducing vehicle emissions would reduce the harms to the
94. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1449 (2007) (majority opinion); see 42 U.S.C.
§ 7521(a)(1) (2000) (quoting the original petition).
95. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922 (notice of denial Sept. 8, 2003).
96. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1450 (summarizing 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925-31)
(citations omitted).
97. See id. at 1451; Mank, supra note 9, at 8-9 nn.41-44 (citing petitions).
98. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
99. See id. at 54.

1722

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1701

petitioners from GHGs. 1'° Conversely, the EPA argued that the
petitioners had "not 'adequately demonstrated' two elements of
standing: that their alleged injuries were 'caused by EPA's decision
not to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from mobile sources';
and that their injuries 'can be redressed by a decision in their favor'
by this court."' 01
A. Judge Randolph
In his opinion announcing the court's judgment, Judge Randolph
avoided deciding whether the petitioners had standing even though
courts must usually determine whether a plaintiff has standing
before considering the merits of its claims.0 2 Judge Randolph
reasoned that the court could first decide the merits of the case
because the merits of the case and the issue of standing
overlapped.01 3 Although the petitioners' affidavits and declarations
sufficiently supported each element of standing to withstand a
motion for summary judgment, he concluded that the petitioner
faced a higher burden to meet standing requirements because
some of the EPA's evidence controverted the petitioners' claims
that GHGs from new vehicles would significantly increase global
warming.104 Because of conflicting evidence about causation and
redressability, Judge Randolph proceeded to decide the case on the
10 5
merits.
On the merits, Judge Randolph did not directly decide whether
the EPA Administrator has the authority under Section 202 of the
CAA to regulate GHGs that "'in his judgment' 'may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."" 6 Instead, he
concluded that, even assuming that the EPA Administrator has the
authority to regulate GHGs pursuant to Section 202, the EPA has
the discretion not to regulate GHG emissions from motor vehicles
100. See id. at 54-55; id. at 65-66 (Tatel, J., dissenting); Mank, supra note 9, at 26-28
(summarizing the causation and redressability prongs).
101. Massachusetts,415 F.3d at 54 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 16).
102. Id.; see Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1451 (majority opinion).
103. Massachusetts,415 F.3d at 56; see Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1451.
104. See Massachusetts,415 F.3d at 55-57.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 57-58 (discussing EPA's authority to regulate GHGs under 42 U.S.C. §
752 1(a)(1) (2000) and quoting the regulation).
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because the EPA's denial of the rulemaking petition did not have
to be based solely on the scientific evidence, which includes the
EPA's concern about scientific uncertainties about global warming.
Rather, the denial could also be based on "policy" considerations
such as the agency's "concern that unilateral regulation of U.S.
motor vehicle emissions could weaken efforts to persuade developing
countries to reduce the intensity of greenhouse gases" and the Bush
Administration's preference for "voluntary emission reduction
programs and initiatives with private entities to develop new
technology .... Judge Randolph determined that the court should
give deference to the EPA's discretionary policy judgment in this
case because the agency was addressing complex and uncertain
issues at the frontiers of scientific knowledge.108 Accordingly, he
held as the judgment of the divided court of appeals that "the EPA
Administrator properly exercised his discretion under § 202(a)(1) in
denying the petition for rulemaking."1°9
B. Judge Sentelle
Judge Sentelle dissented in part and concurred in the judgment
because he argued that courts are required to decide standing
questions before reaching the merits and thus he disagreed with
Judge Randolph's approach of deciding the merits without resolving
the issue of standing.1 ' Judge Sentelle concluded that the EPA was
correct to dismiss the petition because the petitioners had "not
demonstrated the element of injury necessary to establish standing
under Article III.""' He argued that the Article III standing test in
Lujan requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that he has suffered a
"particularized" injury and not just a generalized injury common to
the public at large." 2 Judge Sentelle argued that, pursuant to the
Constitution's separation of powers, generalized public injuries
should be addressed by the politically elected Executive Branch and
Congress rather than the courts:
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 58.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 59 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment).
Id.
Id.
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A case such as this, in which plaintiffs lack particularized injury
is particularly recommended to the Executive Branch and the
Congress. Because plaintiffs' claimed injury is common to all
members of the public, the decision whether or not to regulate
is a policy call requiring a weighing of costs against the
likelihood of success, best made by the democratic branches
taking into account the interests of the public at large. There are
two other branches of government. It is to those other branches
that the petitioners should repair."'
Because global warming is "harmful to humanity at large," Judge
Sentelle concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that
they were sufficiently injured by global warming to have standing
in the federal courts because "the alleged harm is not particularized,
not specific, and in my view, not justiciable.""' Although he
dissented on standing and jurisdiction, Judge Sentelle accepted the
contrary view as the law of the case and joined Judge Randolph's
judgment on the merits dismissing the petition as the result closest
to that which he preferred." 5
C. Judge Tatel
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Tatel concluded that
Massachusetts had at least "satisfied each element of Article III
standing-injury, causation, and redressability." "1 He argued that
Massachusetts made particularized allegations demonstrating a
"substantial probability"'" 7 that projected rises in sea level would
lead to serious losses to its coastal property and that these specific
allegations of injury were a "far cry" from the type of generalized
harm that Judge Sentelle contended was insufficient to establish
Article III jurisdiction."' As to causation, Judge Tatel determined
that the petitioners' affidavits provided strong evidence that GHGs,
including U.S. vehicle emissions, contributed to the sea level

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 60; see also Breedon, supra note 43.
Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 60.
See id. at 60-61.
Id. at 64 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
Id. at 65.
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changes that threatened Massachusetts' coastal property. 119 As to
redressability, he concluded that there was evidence from one of the
petitioners' experts, a former EPA climatologist, that a favorable
judicial decision requiring the EPA to regulate GHGs and vehicle
emissions would delay and reduce the harm to Massachusetts'
coastline. 120 In response to the EPA's argument that the United
States' regulation of vehicle emissions would be ineffective unless
other nations joined the effort, Judge Tatel observed that the
petitioner submitted an affidavit from the one-time director of the
EPA's motor-vehicle pollution control efforts, which concluded that
the EPA's requirement of enforceable emission standards would
lead to the development of new emission control technologies by
other nations. 2 ' On the merits, Judge Tatel concluded that the
Clean Air Act granted the EPA the authority to regulate GHGs, and
that the agency's policy concerns about the impact of mandatory
regulation on the president's ability to negotiate GHG agreements
with other nations did not justify its refusal to make an endangerment finding about the harms of GHGs required by the

statute.122
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S NEW STANDING TEST FOR STATES
A. Justice Stevens'Majority Opinion on Standing
1. Congress May Broadly Define What Constitutesan Injury
In addressing whether the petitioners had standing, the
Massachusetts majority opinion began by emphasizing that
Congress specifically authorized citizen suits in the CAA, and relied
123
heavily upon Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan.
Citing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan, Justice
Stevens observed "[tihat [congressional] authorization is of critical

119. See id.
120. See id. at 65-66.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 73, 80-81.
123. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453 (2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)
(2000)).
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importance to the standing inquiry. 12 4 Justice Stevens, in
Massachusetts, quoted Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in
Lujan for the principle that "Congress has the power to define
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a
case or controversy where none existed before" provided that
Congress "identiffies] the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate[s]
' To qualify
the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit."125
the broad view of congressional authority to confer standing, Justice
Stevens, again quoting Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, stated
that the Court would not "entertain citizen suits to vindicate the
public's nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the
laws."'26 Because Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan,
which was joined by Justice Souter, provided the crucial votes for a
majority in that case, a number of commentators have argued that
his concurrence-rather than Justice Scalia's nominal majority
opinion, which was fully joined by only Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice White, and Justice Thomas-practically constituted the
defining law in that case. 2 ' Furthermore, in the five-to-four
Massachusettsdecision, Justice Stevens likely had to secure Justice
Kennedy's vote by assuring him that the majority opinion was
consistent with Justice Kennedy's prior opinions on standing. 2 '
124. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Buzbee, supranote 73, at 279; Mank, supranote 9, at 63-64 (arguing that the
Akins decision followed Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan).
128. See, e.g., Wooing Kennedy on Warming, Posting of Tony Mauro to BLT: The Blog of
Legal Times, http://legaltimes.typepad.comfblt/2007/04/wooing-kennedy_.html (Apr. 4, 2007,
10:11 EST) (arguing that Justice Kennedy's vote was crucial in the Massachusetts decision
and that Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Roberts each tried to win Justice Kennedy's vote
on the standing issue); Posting of Aaron M. Streett to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.
com/prawfsblawg/2007/weekl4/index.html (Apr. 4, 2007, 16:43 EST) ("Although this opinion
has been touted for its discussion of standing principles, less attention has been paid to the
important legal principle for which it stands: that it is always prudent to curry favor with
[Justice Kennedy] to hold his critical fifth vote."). Many commentators believe that Justice
Kennedy is the key swing vote on the Supreme Court since Sandra Day O'Connor's retirement
in 2006. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm & Sherry Bosse, JusticeKennedy and the Environment:
Property,States'Rights, and a PersistentSearchfor Nexus, 82 WASH. L. REV. 667 (2007); Tony
Mauro, Eyes on Kennedy as Supreme Court Debates Global Warming Case, LEGAL TIMES, Nov.
30, 2006, http://www.law.Comljsp/article.jsp?id=l164810399422; Analysis: Kennedy Key to
Global Warming Challenge, Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.
scotusblog.com/wp/commentary-and-analysis/analysis-kennedy-key-to-global-warming-
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The majority opinion acknowledged that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the "[challenged] action injures him in a concrete and
personal way,"'2 9 but applied a more relaxed analysis of what
constitutes a concrete injury because the petitioners were asserting
a procedural right. 3 ° The Court applied the relaxed standards for
redressability and immediacy applicable to procedural rights cases
following footnote seven in Lujan because the Massachusetts case
involved "the right to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld,
§ 7607(b)(1).' 13 ' Following Lujan, Justice Stevens observed that,
where Congress grants a procedural right to a plaintiff, as in a
citizen suit provision, "that litigant has standing if there is some
possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing
party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the
litigant.' 3 2 Professor Adler has argued that Massachusetts is not a
Court erred in
procedural rights case and that therefore 1 the
33
applying footnote seven standing in this case.
2. The Special Standing Rights of States
In addition to applying the lenient standing analysis for
procedural rights plaintiffs under footnote seven, the Court also
applied a more generous standing analysis because Massachusetts
isa state.134 Because "[o]nly one of the petitioners needs to have
standing to permit us to consider the petition for review," Justice
Stevens, like Judge Tatel, focused on "the special position and
interest of Massachusetts.' 3 5 Justice Stevens stated that "[i]t is of
considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a
sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual.' 36
Relying on Justice Holmes' 1907 opinion in Tennessee Copper,which
challenge/ (Nov. 29, 2006, 11:34 EST).
129. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438,1453 (2007) (majority opinion) (quoting Lujan,
504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
130. See id.
131. Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 (majority opinion)); see Mank, supra note 9, at
35-36 (discussing relaxed standing requirements for procedural injuries).
132. Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1453 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7).
133. See infra Part III.C.2.
134. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454; Stevenson, supra note 3, at 2 n.3.
135. Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1453-54.
136. Id. at 1454.
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authorized Georgia to protect its citizens from air pollution from
outside its borders because of the state's quasi-sovereign interest
in its natural resources and the health of its citizens, the majority
opinion emphasized that the Court long ago "recognized that
States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking
federal jurisdiction.""7 Justice Stevens concluded, "[j]ust as
Georgia's 'independent interest ... in all the earth and air within its
domain' supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does
Massachusetts' well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign
territory today."' 8 Justice Stevens also cited and quoted, as suggestive authority, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Alden v.
Maine, which "observ[ed] that in the federal system, the States 'are
not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations,
but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.""3 9 Additionally, the Court stated, "[t]hat Massachusetts
does in fact own a great deal of the 'territory alleged to be affected'
only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this
case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal
judicial power. '14
Justice Stevens explained that states have standing to protect
their quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare of their
citizens because they have surrendered three crucial sovereign
powers to the federal government: (1) states may no longer use
military force; (2) the Constitution prohibits states from negotiating
treaties with foreign governments; and (3) federal laws may, in
some circumstances, preempt states laws.' The federal government
now enjoys those sovereign prerogatives.' In recognition of all the
powers that states have surrendered to the federal government,
the Court instead has recognized that states can file suit in
federal court to protect their quasi-sovereign interest in the

137. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
139. Id. (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)); see also Streett, supra note 128.
140. Id. (quoting Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237).
141. See id. ("Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some
circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions
might well be pre-empted."); see also Stevenson, supra note 3, at 5-8.
142. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1454.
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health, welfare, and natural resources of their citizens. 4 ' Although
Tennessee Copper was not explicitly a standing case, Justice Stevens
rejected Chief Justice Roberts' argument that the majority misread
that 1907 case by observing that
no less an authority than Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts
and the Federal System understands Tennessee Copper as a
standing decision. Indeed, it devotes an entire section to
chronicling the long development of cases permitting States "to
litigate as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign
interests-i.e., public or governmental interests that concern the
state as a whole." 44
The Court additionally stated that Congress required the EPA
to use the federal government's sovereign powers to protect
states, among others, from vehicle emissions "which in [the
Administrator's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.' 14 ' Furthermore, Congress has "recognized a concomitant
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition
14 Justice
as arbitrary and capricious.""
Stevens concluded that
"[g]iven that procedural right and Massachusetts' stake in
protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is
entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis."'4 7 He implied
that the federal government owes states greater standing rights
because states have surrendered sovereign powers to the federal
government. 14
143. Id. at 1454-55; see infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
144. Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1455 n.17 (citing and quoting RICHARD H. FALLON ETAL.,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 289-90 (5th ed. 2003)

(citation omitted)). In a footnote, Chief Justice Roberts responded in his dissenting opinion:
The Court seems to think we do not recognize that Tennessee Copper is a case
about parenspatriae standing, but we have no doubt about that. The point is
that nothing in our cases (or Hart & Wechsler) suggests that the prudential
requirements for parenspatriae standing can somehow substitute for, or alter
the content of, the "irreducible constitutional minimum" requirements of injury
in fact, causation, and redressability under Article III.
Id. at 1466 n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
145. Id. at 1454 (majority opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000)).
146. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000)).
147. Id. at 1454-55.
148. Id.
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3. MassachusettsMeets the Tests for Injury, Causation,and
Redressability
The Court was ambiguous about whether Massachusetts satisfied
normal standing requirements 14 1 or met those requirements only
because it was a state. In the paragraph after it declared that "the
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing
analysis,"'5 ° the Court stated that "[w]ith that in mind, it is clear
that petitioners' submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have
satisfied the most demanding standards of the adversarial
process."'' The Court's use of the term "[w]ith that in mind"
suggests that it was applying a special standing test for states. The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted Massachusetts as
holding "that states receive 'special solicitude' in standing analysis,
including analysis of imminence." '52 Conversely, the majority's
statement that the "petitioners' submissions as they pertain to
Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding standards of the
adversarial process" arguably implies that Massachusetts could
have met ordinary standing requirements.' 5 3
The Court declared that Massachusetts satisfied all three prongs
of the standing test. Regarding the injury prong of standing, Justice
Stevens determined that the "EPA's steadfast refusal to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts
that is both 'actual' and 'imminent."51 4 As to redressability, he
concluded that there is "a 'substantial likelihood that the judicial
relief 155
requested' will prompt the EPA to take steps to reduce that
risk."
149. See Jonathan Z. Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA, 93 VA. L. REV. IN
BRIEF 53, 57 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/
cannon.pdf (arguing that Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Massachusetts satisfied all three
elements of the standing test because the Court was willing to consider systemic injury as a
legitimate basis for standing).
150. Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1454-55.
151. Id. at 1455.
152. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1294 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
153. See Cannon, supra note 149.
154. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1455 (majority opinion) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
155. Id. (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79
(1978)).
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As to the injury prong of the standing test, the majority opinion
reviewed the petitioners' evidence and found that "[t]he harms
'
associated with climate change are serious and well recognized."1 56
In contrast to Judge Sentelle's conclusion that global warming
involves a generalized grievance that is better addressed by the
political branches,15 7 Justice Stevens stated, "[t]hat these climatechange risks are 'widely shared' does not minimize Massachusetts'
interest in the outcome of this litigation."' 58 He found compelling the
evidence in "petitioners' unchallenged affidavits" that "global sea
levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th
century as a result of global warming" and that "[t]hese rising seas
have already begun to swallow Massachusetts' coastal land."'5 9
Because Massachusetts "'owns a substantial portion of the state's
coastal property,"' the majority opinion found that "it has alleged a
particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner."" 0
Furthermore, the Court found that "[t]he severity of that injury will
only increase over the course of the next century" as sea levels
continue to rise and that "[riemediation costs alone, petitioners
allege, could run well into the hundreds of millions of dollars."''
As to the causation prong of the standing test, the Court found
that the "EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection
between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global
warming. ' Accordingly, the majority opinion concluded that "[a]t
a minimum, therefore, EPA's refusal to regulate such emissions
'contributes' to Massachusetts' injuries."'6 3 Addressing the overlapping issues of causation and redressability, Justice Stevens
rejected the EPA's arguments that "its decision not to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles contributes so
insignificantly to petitioners' injuries that the agency cannot be
haled into federal court to answer for them" and that no "realistic
156. Id.
157. See supra Part II.B.
158. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S.
11, 24 (1998) ("[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found 'injury
in fact."')).
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting the Declaration of Karst R. Hoogeboom, 4).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1457.
163. Id.
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possibility exists that the relief petitioners seek would mitigate
global climate change and remedy their injuries."'"
The EPA next argued that federal courts could not redress the
alleged harms to the petitioners from GHGs "because predicted
increases in greenhouse gas emissions from developing nations,
particularly China and India, are likely to offset any marginal
domestic decrease" that might result if the agency regulated GHGs
from new vehicles. 6 ' The Court rejected the EPA's argument
because it "rests on the erroneous assumption that a small
incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked
in a federal judicial forum."' 6 Justice Stevens observed that
agencies and legislatures "do not generally resolve massive
problems in one fell regulatory swoop."" ' He concluded,"[t]hat a first
step might be tentative does not by itself support the notion that
federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether that step
conforms to law.' 68
Rejecting the EPA's pessimistic assessment, the majority
determined that "reducing domestic automobile emissions is hardly
a tentative step" toward reducing GHG emissions.' 69 Because the
United States transportation sector "accounts for more than 6% of
worldwide carbon dioxide emissions," the Court concluded that "U.S.
motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful contribution to
greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according to petitioners,
to global warming.' ' ' For these reasons, the majority found that the
petitioners had met the causation portion of the standing test.'7 '
In finding that the petitioners had satisfied the redressability
part of the standing test, the Court observed that "[w]hile it may be
true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by itself
reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we lack
jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to slow
or reduce it."'72 Rejecting the argument that the EPA's regulation of
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1457-58.
See id.
Id. at 1458.
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GHG emissions from new vehicles would have little impact because
it would not affect emissions from existing vehicles, the majority
stated that "[b]ecause of the enormity of the potential consequences
associated with man-made climate change, the fact that the
effectiveness of a remedy might be delayed during the (relatively
short) time it takes for a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an older
one is essentially irrelevant.' 17 ' Additionally, Justice Stevens
rebuffed the argument that growing emissions from developing
nations would eclipse any reductions from the EPA's regulation of
vehicles, stating that "[a] reduction in domestic emissions would
slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens
elsewhere."' 7 4 The Court observed that the EPA and President Bush
agreed that the United States should address the issue of global
climate change and that the EPA gave "ardent support for various
voluntary emission-reduction programs."'75 The majority agreed
with Judge Tatel's dissenting opinion that the "EPA would
presumably not bother with such efforts if it thought emissions
reductions would have no discernable impact on future global
warming."' 76
The Court concluded its discussion of the standing issue as
follows:
In sum-at least according to petitioners' uncontested affidavits
-the rise in sea levels associated with global warming has
already harmed and will continue to harm Massachusetts. The
risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real.
That risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received
the relief they seek. We therefore hold that petitioners have
standing to challenge the EPA's denial of their rulemaking
petition. 177
The Court's opinion is somewhat contradictory because it emphasized that the petitioners were entitled to the more lenient standing
requirements for footnote seven procedural rights plaintiffs and that
173. Id.

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting)).
177. Id.
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Massachusetts was entitled to preferential standing as a state,
while it simultaneously implied that Massachusetts had met normal
standing requirements. 7 ' The problem with the Court's dual
approach is that it is not clear to what extent the Court altered its
standing analysis because Massachusetts is a state rather than a
private individual or because the Court applied a footnote seven
analysis. For instance, it is uncertain whether an individual that
owns large tracts of coastline property would have standing if he or
she alleged the same facts because the Court never explains to
what degree or how the standing analysis is different for states
as opposed to individuals. The Court left many questions about
standing unanswered for future courts.
B. Chief Justice Roberts'DissentingOpinion
1. MassachusettsLacks Standing Because Global Warming Is a
Generalized Grievance
Even assuming that global warming is a serious problem, Chief
Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion, argued that it was a
nonjusticiable general grievance that should be decided by the
political branches rather than by the federal courts.' 79 He argued
that it is inappropriate for the Court to apply a more generous
standing test for states because there was no basis in the statute,
precedent, or logic for a different standing test for states. 180 He
emphasized that the CAA does not provide states with greater
rights to sue than ordinary citizens.' 8 ' Chief Justice Roberts argued:
"Nor does the case law cited by the Court provide any support for
the notion that Article III somehow implicitly treats public and
private litigants differently."' 2

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

See Cannon, supra note 149.
See Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1463-64 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 1464-66.
See id. at 1464-65.
Id. at 1465.
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2. States Do Not Have GreaterStandingRights Under the
ParensPatriaeDoctrine
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that Tennessee Copper "did
indeed draw a distinction between a State and private litigants, but
solely with respect to available remedies," giving Georgia the right
to equitable relief when private litigants could obtain only a legal
remedy."8 3 He argued that "[t]he case had nothing to do with Article
III standing."'8 4 He contended that "[i]n contrast to the present case,
there was
no question in Tennessee Copper about Article III
18 5
injury.'
Chief Justice Roberts argued that "Tennessee Copper has since
stood for nothing more than a State's right, in an original
jurisdiction action, to sue in a representative capacity as parens
' ' s and that the parens patriae doctrine
patriae
does not support
giving states greater standing rights than individuals.8 7 He
contended that "[n]othing about a State's ability to sue in that
capacity dilutes the bedrock requirement of showing injury,
causation, and redressability to satisfy Article III."' '8 He explained
that "[a] claim of parens patriae standing is distinct from an
allegation of direct injury" and "[flar from being a substitute for
Article III injury, parenspatriaeactions raise an additional hurdle
for a state litigant: the articulation of a 'quasi-sovereign interest'
'apart from the interests of particular private parties."" 9 Chief
Justice Roberts argued that "a State asserting quasi-sovereign
interests as parens patriaemust still show that its citizens satisfy
Article III. '' 19o Accordingly, he maintained that "[flocusing on
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 1466.
188. Id. at 1465.
189. Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607
(1982)); cf. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 611 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("At the very least, the
prerogative of a State to bring suits in federal court should be commensurate with the ability
of private organizations."). But see MICHAEL L. WELLS ET AL., 2007 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS 38 (2007) (questioning Chief Justice Roberts' assertion that
states in parens patriae suits have to meet additional requirements for standing and
suggesting that a state's quasi-sovereign interest alone is sufficient for standing).
190. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1465.
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Massachusetts' interests as quasi-sovereign makes the required
showing here harder, not easier."1 9 '
More broadly, Chief Justice Roberts complained that "[t]he Court,
in effect, takes what has always been regarded as a necessary
condition for parens patriae standing-a quasi-sovereign interest
-and converts it into a sufficient showing for purposes of Article
III. '92 His charge has some truth if one looks at the narrow holdings
of various parens patriae decisions. As Part IV of this Article will
show, if one looks at the broader theoretical rationale for protecting
the quasi-sovereign interests of states, however, the majority's use
of the quasi-sovereign
doctrine to broaden the standing rights of
1 93
states makes sense.
Chief Justice Roberts did point out a potential flaw in the Court's
use of the quasi-sovereign parens patriae standing doctrine. He
observed that "[tihe Court asserts that Massachusetts is entitled to
'special solicitude' due to its 'quasi-sovereign interests,' ... but then
applies our Article III standing test to the asserted injury of the
State's loss of coastal property ... 'in its capacity as a landowner."'194
Chief Justice Roberts correctly observed that "[i]n the context of
parens patriae standing, however, we have characterized state
ownership of land as a 'nonsovereign interes [t]' because a State 'is
likely to have the same interests as other similarly situated
proprietors.""9 5
Chief Justice Roberts was correct that the majority confuses the
distinction between quasi-sovereign interests and property
interests. Some of Massachusetts' coast, however, is not owned by
the State, and the Commonwealth would have a quasi-sovereign
interest in that property. Additionally, Massachusetts has a more
general quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the health and
welfare of its citizens from harms to its coastline caused by
global warming.'9 6 Thus, the Court was correct in holding that
Massachusetts has both a quasi-sovereign interest and a property
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1465-66.
193. See infra Part IV.
194. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 1455-56
(majority opinion)).
195. Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601
(1982)).
196. Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 7).
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interest in its coastline, but the majority opinion did not explain
that clearly.
Citing the Court's 1923 Massachusetts v. Mellon'19 decision and
a footnote in the 1982 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex
rel. Barez'9 8 decision, Chief Justice Roberts also argued that a state
generally may not assert a quasi-sovereign interest against the
federal government.199 He observed that neither the petitioners nor
the numerous amici supporting the petitioners had ever "cited
Tennessee Copper in their briefs before this Court or the D.C.
Circuit" and speculated that was because of the Mellon limitation on
parens patriae standing. 2°° Professor Adler argues that "[tihe
simplest explanation for Georgia's conspicuous absence from the
briefing is that the decision does not support the proposition for
which it was cited. 2 0 '
In a footnote, the majority opinion defended its reliance on
Tennessee Copper and distinguished Mellon. Quoting its 1945
decision in Georgiav. PennsylvaniaRailroadCo., the Massachusetts
Court stated that "there is a critical difference between allowing a
State 'to protect her citizens from the operation of federal statutes'
(which is what Mellon prohibits) and allowing a State to assert its
rights under federal law (which it has standing to do). 20 2 The
Court's 1945 Georgia decision allowed a state to bring a parens
patriae action against a private party for alleged violations of
federal antitrust laws and arguably limited Mellon to prohibiting
states from filing parens patriae suits that challenge the
constitutionality of a federal statute. 20 3 The Court concluded that
197. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
198. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
199. Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Mellon, 262 U.S.
at 485-86; Snapp, 458 U.S. at 610 n.16).
200. Id.
201. Adler, supra note 3, at 65.
202. Massachusetts,127 S.Ct. at 1455 n.17 (majority opinion) (quoting Georgia v. Pa. R.R.
Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945)).
203. See Georgia, 324 U.S. at 445-47; see also Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, 369 F. Supp. 2d 237, 245 n.8 (D. Conn. 2005); P.R. Pub. Hous. Admin. v. U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 59 F. Supp. 2d 310, 326 (D.P.R. 1999); Kansas v. United States,
748 F. Supp. 797, 802 (D. Kan. 1990); Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155, 1159-60
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Comment, State StandingTo ChallengeFederalAdministrativeAction:A Reexamination of the Parens Patriae Doctrine, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1089-93 (1977) ("Even
assuming Mellon's continued validity as a bar to state parenspatriae suits which allege the
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Massachusetts was properly asserting its quasi-sovereign interest
to require the federal government to enforce the CAA.2 °4 In a
footnote, Chief Justice Roberts argued, in turn, that a state could
"assert rights under a federal statute as parens patriae"against
private parties, but not against the federal government." 5 He also
relied on Alfred L. Snapp & Son's "clear ruling that '[a] State does
not have standing as parenspatriaeto bring an action against the
Federal Government."'2 °6 The majority opinion, however, cited a
subsequent parens patriae case in which the Court allowed a crossclaim against the United States. °7 Although they are not discussed
in the Supreme Court's decision, Part IV will address some lower
court decisions that have allowed states to file parens patriae suits
against the federal government. °s
It seems most likely that Justice Kennedy suggested that the
majority rely on Tennessee Copper. The petitioners did not cite
Tennessee Copper in their briefs." 9 Arizona and four other states
filed an amicus brief in which they argued that states should have
standing to sue when the decision of a federal agency, including the
EPA's decision in that case, may preempt their state laws regulating
GHGs.2 1 ° The preemption argument is based on the state's sovereign
unconstitutionality of a statute, many courts have begun to distinguish such suits from state
parenspatriae suits that seek review of federal agency action allegedly inconsistent with a
federal statute.").
204. See Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. at 1455 n.17.
205. Id. at 1466 n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
206. Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610
n.16 (1982)).
207. See id. at 1455 n.17 (majority opinion) (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 20
(1995) (holding that Wyoming had standing to bring a cross-claim against the United States
to vindicate its '"quasi-sovereign'interests which are 'independent of and behind the titles of
its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.')).
208. See infra note 386 and accompanying text.
209. See Adler, supranote 3, at 65.
210. See Brief of the States of Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota and Wisconsin as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at **20-25, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)
(No. 05-1120), 2006 WL2563380 [hereinafter Arizona Amicus Brief]; see also Stevenson, supra
note 3, at 32-36 (agreeing with Arizona Amicus Brief that states should have standing to sue
when the decision of a federal agency, including EPA's decision in that case, may preempt
their state laws regulating GHGs); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 2, 6-7,
9-11). The Arizona Amicus Brief relied on four lower court decisions, but no Supreme Court
precedent for the principle that a state has standing to challenge a federal statute or
regulation that potentially preempts a state law. See Arizona Amicus Brief, supra,at **22-23;
see also Alaska v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Ohio ex rel.
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interest in enacting its own laws rather than the quasi-sovereign
interest relied on in Tennessee Copper.2 11 Massachusetts and the
other petitioners cited the Arizona brief in their brief.2 12 During the
oral argument before the Supreme Court, James R. Milkey, an
assistant attorney general for Massachusetts and the petitioners'
only oral advocate before the Court, made a standing argument
based on preemption by claiming that states have "special standing"
to challenge federal laws or regulations that potentially preempt
state laws.2" ' During the oral argument, Justice Ginsburg explicitly
agreed with the standing argument in the Arizona brief,2 14 but the
preemption standing line of reasoning was not mentioned in the
Court's decision.21 5
Instead, during the oral argument in the case, Justice Kennedy
stated that Tennessee Copper was the petitioners' "best case"
supporting their standing, although he also remarked that the
decision was "pre-Massachusetts versus Mellon. 2 16 Justice Kennedy
has strongly supported federalism and state rights since he was
Celebrezze v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 766 F.2d 228, 232-33 (6th Cir. 1985); Conference of State
Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 710 F.2d 878, 880 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Florida v. Weinberger,
492 F.2d 488, 494 (5th Cir. 1974); Stevenson, supra note 3, at 32-36; Watts & Wildermuth,
supra note 4 (manuscript at 7 n.43).
211. See Watts & Wildermuth, supranote 4 (manuscript at 9-11).
212. See Arizona Amicus Brief, supra note 210, at 6 n.5.
213. Transcript of Oral Argument at **14-17, Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007)
(No. 05-1120), 2006 WL 3431932 [hereinafter Oral Argument] (statement of James R. Milkey,
Assistant Attorney General for Massachusetts, for Petitioners, citing the Arizona brief and
a case from the court of appeals); see also West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (D.C. Cir.
2004); Stevenson, supranote 3, at 29-31.
214. See Oral Argument, supranote 213, at **16-17.
215. See Stevenson, supranote 3, at 35 (stating that the Massachusettsdecision did not cite
any cases in the Arizona brief); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 11)
("Because the CAA allows California to create its own laws with respect to motor vehicle
emissions and other states to adopt those standards, we think the Court should have
examined whether California and the piggy-backing states had a sovereign interest at stake
in this case. If the Court concluded that there was a sovereign interest at stake, as we believe
there is, there would have been no need for any state to satisfy the Lujan requirements and
thus no need to create a Lujan-lite analysis for states.").
216. Oral Argument, supra note 213, at *15 (statement of Justice Kennedy); Thomas J.
Donlon, Supreme Court Boldly Steps into Global Warming Debate, ABA News &
Developments: E-Flash for April 2007, http://www.abanet.orgtlitigation/committees/appellate/
news_0407.html ("Apparently, the [Tennessee Copper] case was first raised by Justice
Kennedy at oral argument."); Douglas T. Kendall & Jennifer Bradley, How Environmentalists
Can Win Over the Supreme Court, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Dec. 1, 2006, at 1, http://www.
communityrights.org/PDFsTheNewRep 12.01.06.pdf; Mauro, supra note 128.

1740

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1701

appointed to the Court by President Reagan in 1988.217 He likely
was attracted to Tennessee Copper as a justification for standing
because that case strongly supports the rights of states.2 1
Although Chief Justice Roberts' discussion of Tennessee Copper is
technically accurate, the implications of that decision are broader
than he concedes. Tennessee Copper was decided thirty-seven years
before the Court first explicitly used a standing test in Stark v.
Wickard,21 s so it is not surprising that Justice Holmes did not
even mention the issue of standing.2 ° As is discussed in Part IV,
Tennessee Copper gave states broader remedies than private
litigants based on the principle that states have broader rights
when they protect quasi-sovereign interests than private litigants
have in suing for private interests. 2
3. MassachusettsFailed To Prove Injury, Causation,or
Redressability
Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Court did not explain
how its "special solicitude" for Massachusetts affected its standing
217. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (holding that states retain residual
sovereignty under a federalist system and therefore Congress may not subject non-consenting
states to private suits for damages in state courts); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (interpreting the Commerce Clause in light of federalist
concerns); Blumm & Bosse, supra note 128, at 672-73, 703-04, 715-18, 722 (arguing that
federalism and states' rights are a central theme in Justice Kennedy's jurisprudence); Kendall
& Bradley, supra note 216, at 2 ('To Justice Kennedy, the [Massachusetts] case seems to turn
instead on the political theory of James Madison."); Dawn Reeves & Lara Beaven, Justice
Kennedy Fulfills Role as Key but Elusive Environmental Vote, INSIDE EPA, June 29, 2007,
http://www.insideepa.com (subscription required) (reporting unidentified "high court expert"
as stating that Justice Kennedy generally supports the position of states in environmental
cases before the Court during the 2006-07 term). Some argue that Justice Kennedy takes a
"pragmatic" approach to federalist concerns. See Ann Athouse, Enforcing FederalismAfter
United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 793, 801-04 (1996); Stephen R. McAllister, Is There
a Judicially Enforceable Limit to CongressionalPower Under the Commerce Clause?, 44 U.
KAN. L. REV. 217, 238-42 (1996).
218. See Kendall & Bradley, supra note 216, at 1-2 (arguing that Justice Kennedy stated
that Tennessee Copper was the "best" standing precedent in the Massachusettscase because
the former case is based on the principle that states have greater rights than individual
citizens in our federalist system of government).
219. 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944).
220. See Mank, supra note 9, at 22 (discussing the history of the Court's use of standing
criteria).
221. See infra Part 1V.G.
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analysis, "except as an implicit concession that petitioners cannot
establish standing on traditional terms."22' 2 He asserted that "the
status of Massachusetts as a State cannot compensate for
petitioners' failure to demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and
redressability."'22 Chief Justice Roberts first asserted that the
petitioners' injuries from global warming failed to meet Lujan's
requirement that the alleged injury be "particularized" because they
were common to the public at large.2 24 He also argued that the
petitioners' evidence that rising sea levels was insufficient to
establish that the injury is "actual or imminent, not conjectural or
2 2 because the computer modeling program relied upon
hypothetical""
by the plaintiffs had a significant range of uncertainty.2 2 In a
footnote, the majority responded that the petitioners did not have
to prove the amount of loss with exactitude, but merely had to
demonstrate that it was likely that rising sea levels would result in
the loss of some of Massachusetts' coastline.2 27 Additionally, Chief
Justice Roberts argued that, even if the models were correct about
the loss of coastline, the injury was not immediate if its full effects
would not be felt until 2 100.228 He stated: "[A]ccepting a centurylong time horizon and a series of compounded estimates renders
requirements of imminence and immediacy utterly toothless. 22 9
Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the petitioners
failed to prove that a causal connection existed between the alleged
injury of loss of coastal land in Massachusetts and "the lack of new
motor vehicle greenhouse gas emission standards.,, 2' Because GHGs
persist in the atmosphere "for anywhere from 50 to 200 years" and
"domestic motor vehicles contribute about 6 percent of global
carbon dioxide emissions and 4 percent of global greenhouse gas
222. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1466 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1466-67.
224. See id. at 1467.
225. Id.
226. See id. at 1467-68 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992));
accord Bertagna, supra note 10, at 444-46 ("Global warming plaintiffs cannot take their
imminent injury claims out of the speculative category, because their claims are based
entirely on conjectural, complex systems of climate modeling.").
227. See Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1456 n.21 (majority opinion).
228. See id. at 1468 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Adler, supra note 3, at 68.
229. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1468 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Adler, supranote 3,
at 67-68.
230. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1468-69.
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emissions," the petitioners' request that the EPA regulate emissions
from "new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines" would
have only a tiny impact on total global GHGs.23 ' He concluded:
In light of the bit-part domestic new motor vehicle greenhouse
gas emissions have played in what petitioners describe as a 150year global phenomenon, and the myriad additional factors
bearing on petitioners' alleged injury-the loss of Massachusetts
coastal land-the connection is far too speculative to establish
causation.""
By contrast, the majority rejected similar arguments by the EPA
and concluded instead that the petitioners had established causation because "U.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful
contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according
to petitioners, to global warming."23'
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts argued that "[r]edressability is
even more problematic" because of the "tenuous link between
petitioners' alleged injury and the indeterminate fractional
domestic emissions at issue here" and the additional problem that
the "petitioners cannot meaningfully predict what will come of the
80 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions that originate outside
the United States."23' 4 He criticized the petitioners' claim that other
countries would follow the lead of the United States if it reduced its
motor vehicle emissions because that assertion ignored the impact
of cost on other nations' decisions and that U.S. courts would have
no authority to force other countries to reduce their emissions.2 35
Chief Justice Roberts rejected the majority's conclusion that "any
decrease in domestic emissions will 'slow the pace of global
emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.' 23 6
The Chief Justice argued that the Court's reasoning failed to
satisfy the three-part standing test's requirement that a court find
that it is "likely" that a remedy will redress the "particular injury in

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id. at 1469.
Id. at 1457-58 (majority opinion); see supra text accompanying notes 165-71.
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1469 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 1469-70.
Id. at 1470 (quoting id. at 1458 (majority opinion)).
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fact" at issue. 23" He complained that "even if regulation does reduce
emissions-to some indeterminate degree, given events elsewhere
in the world-the Court never explains why that makes it likely
that the injury in fact-the loss of land-will be redressed. '23 8 By
contrast, the Court concluded that the petitioners met the
redressability and other standing requirements because reducing
domestic emissions would reduce the loss of land and the risk of
catastrophic harm to some extent. 23 9 Implicitly, Chief Justice
Roberts appeared to demand that the petitioners quantify, at least
to some extent, how much land might be saved by the EPA's
regulation of emissions from new vehicles and new engines to
establish standing. The majority, however, was satisfied that the
petitioners had shown that such regulation would reduce the risk to
the Massachusetts coastline from rising sea levels resulting from
GHGs and higher temperatures, despite the uncertainties about
how much land the EPA's regulation of new vehicles would save.
The disagreement between the majority and Chief Justice Roberts'
minority opinion demonstrates that the Court's standing test is
far from precise and can be applied in different ways by different
judges.
4. Chief JusticeRoberts Accuses the Majority of Intruding upon
the Role of the PoliticalBranches
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that different judges
could sometimes reasonably "debate" the application of imprecise
standing standards, such as what is '"fairly' traceable or 'likely' to
be redressed."2 4 He contended, however, that the Court's loose
application of standing principles in this case failed to consider
separation of powers principles limiting the judiciary to "concrete
cases."24' 1 He argued that the majority's recognition of standing in a
case involving broad policy issues results in the Court intruding
upon policy decisions appropriately within the purview of the

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 1458 (majority opinion). See supra Part III.A.3.
Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1470 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
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political branches of government.2 42 Chief Justice Roberts implied
that the right of citizens to elect representatives to Congress and a
President is an adequate answer to any sovereign rights that states
surrender without expanding the rights of states to have standing
in the federal courts.2 43
Chief Justice Roberts argued that "[t]oday's decision recalls the
previous high-water mark of diluted standing requirements, United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP). 244 He summarized SCRAP as follows:
In SCRAP, the Court based an environmental group's
standing to challenge a railroad freight rate surcharge on the
group's allegation that increases in railroad rates would cause
an increase in the use of nonrecyclable goods, resulting in the
increased need for natural resources to produce such goods.
According to the group, some of these resources might be taken
from the Washington area, resulting in increased refuse that
might find its way into area parks, harming the group's
members.2 45
The Court has never expressly overruled SCRAP, but in its 1990
decision Whitmore v. Arkansas,246 the Court strongly questioned its
rationale, stating that SCRAP involved "[p]robably the most
attenuated injury conferring Art. III standing" and "surely went to
the very outer limit of the law."2'47 Chief Justice Roberts agreed that
"[t]he difficulty with SCRAP, and the reason it has not been
is the attenuated nature of the injury there."24 He
followed ...
argued that "SCRAP became emblematic not of the looseness of
Article III standing requirements, but of how utterly manipulable
they are if not taken seriously as a matter of judicial selfrestraint."2 4' 9 He continued, "SCRAP made standing seem a lawyer's
242. See id. at 1470-71.
243. See id. at 1463-64 (arguing that the majority had usurped the authority of political
branches by unduly expanding standing rights of states).
244. Id. at 1470 (citing 412 U.S. 669 (1973)).
245. Id. at 1471.
246. 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
247. Id. at 158-59; see Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990) (stating that
SCRAP "has never since been emulated by this Court").
248. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1471 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 1471.
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game, rather than a fundamental limitation ensuring that courts
function as courts and not intrude on the politically accountable
branches.250° He concluded, 'Today's decision is SCRAP for a new
generation."2' 5 1
In a footnote, the majority responded to Chief Justice Roberts'
comparison of the case to SCRAP. First, the Court observed that he
did not "disavow this portion of Justice Stewart's opinion for the
Court" in which the SCRAP Court had stated "that standing is not
to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury ....
To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because
many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious
and widespread Government actions could be questioned by
nobody.252 In a footnote, Chief Justice Roberts agreed that the
portion of the SCRAP decision quoted by the Court was not
problematic, but "[r]ather it is the attenuated nature of the injury
' The majority also challenged Chief Justice Roberts' claim
there."2 53
that the Court had followed SCRAP in making standing a "lawyer's
game."25' 4 The majority responded: "It is moreover quite wrong to
analogize the legal claim advanced by Massachusetts and the other
public and private entities who challenge EPA's parsimonious
construction of the Clean Air Act to a mere 'lawyer's game."'25 Chief
Justice Roberts responded in turn that "[o]f course it is not the legal
challenge that is merely 'an ingenious academic exercise in the
2 6
conceivable,' but the assertions made in support of standing.""
In the concluding paragraph of his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts
argued that the Court implicitly recognized that the petitioners
could not meet normal standing criteria when the majority
'
"devise[d] a new doctrine of state standing to support its result."2 57
He saw a small silver lining in an otherwise bad standing decision,
stating: 'The good news is that the Court's 'special solicitude' for
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1458 n.24 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669
687-88 (1973)).
253. Id. at 1471 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 1471.
255. Id. at 1459 n.24 (majority opinion) (quoting id. at 1471 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
256. Id. at 1471 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688 (citation
omitted)).
257. Id. at 1471.
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Massachusetts limits the future applicability of the diluted standing
requirements applied in this case."2 5 Conversely, he concluded,
"[t]he bad news is that the Court's self-professed relaxation of
those Article III requirements has caused us to transgress 'the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic
society."'2 59
C. Analysis
A major weakness in the Court's opinion is that it never explained
to what extent it had relaxed standing requirements for states. It
provided little or no guidance to lower courts about the degree to
which they should give "special solicitude" to states in deciding
standing issues." ° The majority opinion is murky about how much
extra deference states should receive with regard to standing,
because the Court was unwilling to acknowledge that the
petitioners failed to meet any part of the three-prong standing test.
Additionally, the Court invoked the more relaxed immediacy and
redressability requirements for procedural rights cases under
footnote seven of Lujan, but did not explain how much more
relaxed those requirements are compared to substantive cases.2 61
Furthermore, because the case involved both procedural and
substantive issues, it is at least questionable whether the case is a
procedural rights action entitled to the relaxed footnote seven
analysis.
1. The Court Does Not Provide a Clear Test for State
Standing
The Court never clearly explained whether the petitioners could
have met the three-part standing test without the benefit of the
special standing position of states. Chief Justice Roberts' argument
that the majority's approach of giving states special standing rights
was an implicit admission that the petitioners could not meet

258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. (quoting id. at 1455 (majority opinion)).
Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
See id. at 1454-55 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1453.
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ordinary standing principles has some truth,6 2 but the Court's
opinion is more complicated. The majority appears to have it both
ways: The Court argued that the petitioners met the three-part
standing test, but also suggested that if there are any doubts about
whether they have met any facet of the test, then Massachusetts as
a state will receive the benefit of the doubt.6 3
The majority opinion is also somewhat unclear about which kind
of state interests are entitled to special standing analysis. The Court
made a strong argument that states deserve special protection of
quasi-sovereign interests because they have surrendered aspects of
their sovereignty to the United States, and, therefore, can no longer
defend the interests in the health and welfare of their citizens
through war or diplomacy.2 4 Yet the Court also observed that the
fact that Massachusetts owned a great deal of the coastline
strengthened the argument that it had a concrete stake in the
case. 215 On the whole, the Court's opinion most strongly supports the
view that states deserve special protection of quasi-sovereign
interests in parens patriae cases. However the opinion does not
necessarily establish that states are entitled to special standing
rights in cases in which they are a mere property owner comparable
to an ordinary citizen.
2. It Is Questionable Whether MassachusettsIs a Procedural
Rights Plaintiff,but the Court Has Never Provided a Good
Definition of When Footnote Seven Applies
Commentators have predicted that it would be easier for plaintiffs
asserting global warming claims to prove standing in a procedural
rights case, such as a NEPA action, than in a substantive case,
including tort or nuisance actions, because of the relaxed immediacy
and redressability requirements for procedural rights plaintiffs
under Lujan's footnote seven. 6 For example, one commentator
262. Id. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
263. See id. at 1454-55 (majority opinion).
264. See id. at 1454.
265. Id.
266. See Bertagna, supra note 10, at 456-58 (arguing that substantive global warming
claims are unlikely to meet standing requirements, but that procedural rights cases under
NEPA have a better chance of meeting standing requirements); Bradford C. Mank, Civil
Remedies, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE & U.S. LAW 183, 184-99, 215-19, 237-38 (Michael B.
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argued that "[t]he principal way in which the relaxed standards of
procedural standing assist global warming plaintiffs is by allowing
them to allege an injury that will occur in the future. 2 67 In footnote
seven, the Lujan Court stated that a NEPA plaintiff could challenge
a dam that might not be completed "for many years."26' 8 In
Massachusetts, the petitioners presented estimates of damage to
Massachusetts' coastline through 2100;269 such information would
only meet the relaxed immediacy requirements under footnote
seven for procedural rights plaintiffs and not for normal standing
requirements. 2 0 Additionally, according to some lower court
decisions and commentators, the standard for redressability is
relaxed for procedural rights plaintiffs; this view holds that these
plaintiffs do not have to prove that a favorable decision from the
court will "fully remedy" their injuries.2 71 Thus, it is not surprising
that the majority in Massachusetts characterized the petitioners'
action as procedural in nature on the grounds that the petitioners
were challenging the EPA's refusal to act on their petition under 42
U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), which provides "the right to challenge agency
action unlawfully withheld. 2 72
Professor Adler, however, argues that the majority inappropriately applied the relaxed standing analysis because
'Massachusetts claimed substantive injury, for which it sought
Gerrard ed., 2007) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit, and probably the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits, would accept NEPA suits raising global warming issues, but that the District of
Columbia Circuit applied stricter standing approach even in procedural rights cases).
267. Bertagna, supra note 10, at 460.
268. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992); see also Bertagna, supra
note 10, at 461.
269. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1456 n.20; id. at 1467-68 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(criticizing Massachusetts' use of estimates of sea level rise through 2100); see also Adler,
supranote 3, at 67-68.
270. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1467-68 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
Massachusetts' evidence of estimated sea level rise did not satisfy the immediacy test for
standing); Adler, supranote 3, at 67-68.
271. Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying relaxed
standing analysis for redressability in a procedural rights case); Pye v. United States, 269
F.3d 459, 471 (4th Cir. 2001); Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that
a procedural rights plaintiff meets redressability requirement if the challenged project "could
be influenced" by the court's decision); Bertagna, supra note 10, at 463-64.
272. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (majority opinion) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)
(2000)); see also id. at 1454 (stating that "Congress has moreover recognized a concomitant
procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and
capricious" (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2000))).
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substantive relief. 273 Professor Adler apparently would limit the
relaxed standing analysis in footnote seven of Lujan to solely
procedural actions such as those under NEPA. 74 Whether the Court
was right to apply footnote seven analysis, or whether Professor
Adler is right, is complicated because the Court has never clearly
defined under what circumstances the relaxed immediacy and
redressability requirements for procedural rights plaintiffs apply.
In applying Lujan's standing test, Professor Buzbee has argued
that "[t]he line between substantive and procedural agency errors
is unclear."27' 5 He observes that "[e]xactly what a 'procedural rights'
injury or harm is remains foggy. '276 In his Lujan dissent, Justice
Blackmun, who was joined by Justice O'Connor, criticized the
majority's procedural rights distinction by stating that "[m]ost
governmental conduct can be classified as 'procedural.' 2 7 7
Additionally, he observed that "[i]n complex regulatory areas ...
Congress often legislates ... in procedural shades of gray.... [I]t sets
forth substantive policy goals and provides for their attainment by
requiring Executive Branch officials to follow certain procedures, for
example, in the form of reporting, consultation, and certification
requirements. 2 7 8
Professor Buzbee maintains that many cases in which
administrative agencies are defendants "occuro in the context of
intermediate government actions. 2 79 He explains, "I mean actions
short of the final step in the decision-making process created by a
relevant enabling act. Part of a statutory sequence of steps may be
complete, but other decisions and actions must occur before final
choices are made and tangible results impacting a plaintiff
follow."28 In Bennett v. Spear,28 1 the Court treated the government's
intermediate steps in deciding whether certain habitat was "critical
273. Adler, supranote 3, at 68.
274. See id.
275. Buzbee, supra note 73, at 255 n.33.
276. Buzbee, supra note 83, at 793 n.148.
277. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 601 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
see also Buzbee, supranote 83, at 793 n.148; Buzbee, supra note 73, at 255 n.33.
278. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Buzbee, supra note 83, at
793 n.148; Buzbee, supra note 73, at 255 n.33.
279. Buzbee, supra note 73, at 255 n.33.
280. Id.
281. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
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habitat" used by endangered species as procedural omissions even
though the statute ultimately required the Secretary of Interior to
make a substantive decision.2 82 The Bennett Court stated: "It is
rudimentary administrative law that discretion as to the substance
of the ultimate decision does not confer discretion to ignore the
required procedures of decisionmaking.... Since it is the omission of
these required procedures that petitioners complain of, their [16
U.S.C.] § 1533 claim is reviewable under § 1540(g)(1)(C)." 28
Although Professor Buzbee is critical of the Bennett Court's
approach of dividing procedural and substantive steps that are
ultimately substantive in nature,28 4 Bennett is arguably precedent
for applying the Lujan footnote seven standing test by treating a
case with intermediate procedural steps as a procedural rights case
even though the agency must ultimately decide a substantive
issue.2 85
In Massachusetts,the petitioners of the Act sought, under Section
202, both procedural action by the EPA in determining whether CO 2
is "reasonably ...
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,"
and substantive action in regulating emissions from new vehicles.28 6
The procedural and substantive aspects of Section 202 are
intertwined because, as the majority stated, "[i]f EPA makes a
finding of endangerment, the Clean Air Act requires the agency to
regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new motor
' Yet in the conclusion of the opinion, the Court simply
vehicles."2 87
required the EPA to fulfill its procedural duty to explain its
reasons for not taking action, and did not require the agency to
take substantive action. "In short, EPA has offered no reasoned
explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases cause
or contribute to climate change. Its action was therefore 'arbitrary,
capricious, ... or otherwise not in accordance with law."' 2 The Court
effectively stated that the EPA must fulfill its procedural duties
282. See id. at 172; Buzbee, supranote 83, at 793 n.148.
283. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 172 (internal citations omitted); see also Buzbee, supra note 83,
at 793 n.148.
284. See Buzbee, supra note 83, at 793 n.148. See generally id. at 793-98, 800-09, 811-23
(discussing procedural and substantive aspects of Bennett).
285. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 172; Buzbee, supra note 83, at 793 n.148.
286. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000).
287. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462 (2007) (majority opinion).
288. Id. at 1463 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2000)).
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under Section 202, but did not address to what extent the Court
would require the agency to make any substantive determinations.
However, the majority went on to note:
We need not and do not reach the question whether on remand
EPA must make an endangerment finding, or whether policy
concerns can inform EPA's actions in the event that it makes
such a finding ....
We hold only that EPA must ground its reasons
for action or inaction in the statute.289
Following Bennett and Professor Buzbee's intermediate step
analysis, the Massachusetts Court's order could be construed as
simply requiring the EPA to take an intermediate procedural action
in explaining its reasoning for denying the petition. Arguably,
footnote seven standing could apply in Massachusettsbecause of the
intermediate procedural steps in the case even though the EPA may
eventually need to make a substantive decision.29 °
Because the Massachusettsdecision only required the EPA to take
an "intermediate procedural" step in explaining its reasoning for
denying the petition,29 1 the Court's characterization of the case as
procedural in nature is arguably correct. Nevertheless, Professor
Adler is right to question the majority's assertion that the case is a
procedural rights challenge that neatly fits under footnote seven of
the Lujan decision. The Court needs to develop a better analysis for
whether Lujan footnote seven standing applies to a case that
involves intermediate procedural steps and an ultimate substantive
decision.
The Court might have decided the case in favor of the petitioners
without invoking footnote seven's relaxed standing requirements for
procedural rights plaintiffs. It is worth noting that Judge Tatel
concluded that Massachusetts met all of the standing requirements
289. Id. (internal citations omitted).
290. Professor Adler acknowledges that the Court's decision technically only requires the
EPA to reconsider its decision, but then argues that "the adoption of new vehicle emission
standards is only a matter of time" because the Bush Administration and EPA have already
conceded that GHGs pose serious risks of climate change. Jonathan H. Adler, Massachusetts
v. EPA Heats Up ClimatePolicy No Less Than Administrative Law: A Comment on Professors
Watts and Wildermuth, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 8-13, available
at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2007/20/LRColl2007n2OAdler.pdf).
291. See supra notes 279-90 and accompanying text.
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without invoking the relaxed standards in footnote seven of
Lujan.2 92 The Supreme Court in Massachusetts suggested that the
plaintiffs had met normal standing requirements, but also invoked
the relaxed analysis of footnote seven.29 3 If the majority was
confident that the plaintiffs had met the normal three-part standing
test, the Court could have clearly stated so and then it would not
have needed to invoke the footnote seven standing doctrine in a case
that did not squarely fit within a procedural rights framework.
As is addressed in Part V, this Article's proposed standing test
would eliminate any dispute about whether a case is procedural,
because states filing parens patriae actions would be entitled to the
same relaxed immediacy and redressability requirements as
procedural rights plaintiffs even if the state's case is substantive in
nature.294 The proposed test would address the Court's failure to
define how states are treated differently from other plaintiffs in
determining standing.
3. Did Massachusetts Meet the TraditionalThree-part Standing
Test?
Even if one accepts Professor Adler's argument that the Court
should not have applied footnote seven procedural rights standing
in the case, the majority arguably could have followed Judge Tatel's
analysis and concluded that Massachusetts met standing requirements. If the Court's three-part standing test is applied liberally, on
the whole, the Court's opinion is persuasive that Massachusetts'
allegations about the loss of its coastline from rising sea levels
caused by global warming, which, in turn, are caused by growing
concentrations of GHGs, is sufficient to meet standing requirements. The Court correctly rejected the EPA's argument "that
because greenhouse gas emissions inflict widespread harm, the
doctrine of standing presents an insuperable jurisdictional
292. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting), rev'd,
127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
293. See Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1453 (characterizing the case as involving procedural
rights); id. at 1455-58 (stating that plaintiffs had met the three-part standing test); Cannon,
supra note 149, at 57 (arguing that Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Massachusetts
satisfied all three elements of the standing test because the Court was willing to consider
systemic injury as a legitimate basis for standing); see also supra Part III.A.3.
294. See infra Part V.
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obstacle."29' 5 Chief Justice Roberts did not challenge the majority's
favorable discussion of the SCRAP Court's conclusion that standing
is not to be denied simply because many people are injured.2 9 6
Regarding the injury portion of the standing test, the Court found
that Massachusetts had established that global warming caused a
ten to twenty centimeter increase in global sea levels over the
course of the twentieth century and that those increases have
probably already caused harm to its coastline.2 97 The current
injuries to Massachusetts' coastline are concrete and immediate,
and it is probable that growing levels of GHGs during the twentyfirst century will cause even greater harms to its coastline in the
future.29 Although Chief Justice Roberts is correct that computer
models projecting the relationship between GHG levels and sea
levels are far from precise, the majority opinion makes the stronger
argument that Massachusetts showed injury in fact even if the exact
magnitude of any future injuries was uncertain. 9
Concerning the causation part of the standing test, the Court and
Chief Justice Roberts disagreed about to what extent the petitioners
had to establish that GHGs from new domestic motor vehicles were
a significant factor in causing Massachusetts to lose coastal land.
Because the U.S. transportation sector represents 6 percent of
worldwide carbon dioxide emissions, the Court determined that
"LJ.S. motor-vehicle emissions make a meaningful contribution to
greenhouse gas concentrations and hence, according to petitioners,
to global warming."' ' By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts argued
that the petitioners failed to establish that the EPA's regulation of
GHGs from new domestic motor vehicles would prevent the loss of
Massachusetts' coastal land when regulation of new vehicles
would reduce only a fraction of the 4 percent of GHGs produced
by the U.S. transportation sector.'s He argued that such emissions play only a "bit-part" in the impact of the "150-year global
295. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453.
296. See id. at 1458 n.24 (citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1973)); id. at 1471 n.2 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
297. See id. at 1456 (majority opinion).
298. See id.
299. Compare id. at 1456 n.21 (majority opinion), with id. at 1467-68 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
300. Id. at 1457-58 (majority opinion).
301. Id. at 1468-69 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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phenomenon" of global warming and, therefore, it was speculative
that the lack of EPA regulation had an impact on the alleged injury
of Massachusetts losing coastal land. °2
The "fairly traceable" standard for causation does not provide
an exact test for what percentage of harm an alleged cause
must contribute to a plaintiffs alleged injuries. 33 If a defendant's
activities have only a trivial impact on a plaintiff, then a court
should deny standing. Deciding whether the U.S. transportation
sector is a meaningful factor in increasing global warming depends
on whether one emphasizes the more than 1.7 billion metric tons of
carbon dioxide it released in 1999 alone, which the Court cited as
evidence of its enormous impact, or whether one emphasizes, as in
Chief Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion, the small percentage that
figure represents of worldwide emissions.0 4 Although Chief Justice
Roberts is correct that the EPA's regulation would apply only to
new vehicles, over time an increasing percentage of all domestic
vehicles would be subject to regulation as old vehicles are
eventually replaced by new ones. Because the U.S. transportation
sector contributes 4 percent of worldwide GHGs, the Court properly
decided that the regulation of these emissions was more than a
trivial factor in affecting global warming and therefore was a
sufficiently meaningful factor to warrant standing under the fairly
traceable standard.
The EPA argued that the plaintiffs could not meet the
redressability portion of the standing test because federal courts
could not control the rapidly growing emissions of developing
nations, including China and India." 5 According to the EPA, a
favorable court decision for the plaintiffs ordering the agency to
control domestic new vehicle emissions might be fruitless if foreign
emissions grew more rapidly than domestic reductions.0 6 The Court
was correct to reject the EPA's argument because a remedy that
reduced the harm to the petitioners by limiting domestic emissions
was enough to warrant standing even if the remedy could not
302. Id. at 1469.
303. See id. at 1464; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
304. Compare Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1457-58 (majority opinion), with id. at 1468-69
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
305. See id. at 1457-58 (majority opinion).
306. See id.
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prevent greater harms from GHGs emitted by foreign countries.
Although Chief Justice Roberts is correct that the petitioners must
establish that it is "likely" that the proposed relief will remedy their
alleged injuries, he demands too much in essentially demanding
that the petitioners quantify, at least to some extent, how the EPA's
regulation of GHGs will reduce erosion of its coastline despite an
increase in GHGs from other nations. 3 °8 The majority is correct that
regulating GHGs is likely to reduce the impacts of GHGs from what
they would have been with no regulation. As discussed in the
preceding paragraph, the U.S. transportation sector's 4 percent
contribution to worldwide GHGs is more than a trivial factor in
affecting global warming. Chief Justice Roberts demands a certainty
in predicting the impact of the remedy that is not required.
There is a more than plausible argument that Massachusetts
met the normal three-part standing test, as Judge Tatel concluded
and the majority of the Supreme Court suggested." 9 Nevertheless,
one must acknowledge that without the relaxed immediacy and
redressability standards of footnote seven or the special solicitude
that the majority gave to states, the issue of whether Massachusetts
met normal standing requirements is debatable. Chief Justice
Roberts and Judge Sentelle present a plausible case that
Massachusetts failed to meet the normal standing test. 1 '
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the majority sought to
characterize the case as both a footnote seven case and a special
state standing case so that more lenient standing requirements
would apply.
The main difficulty with the Court's standing analysis is that it
is never clear to what extent the majority applied reduced standing
requirements under footnote seven or a special solicitude for states
standard. It is possible that some members of the majority believed,
like Judge Tatel, that Massachusetts had met normal standing
requirements and that other members of the majority did not. As
a result, the Court suggested simultaneously that Massachusetts
-307

307. See id. at 1458.

308. See id. at 1469-70 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 1455-58 (majority opinion) (explaining that plaintiffs had met the three-part
standing test); Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007); Cannon, supra note 149, at 57; see supra Parts II.C, III.A.3.
310. See supra Parts II.C, III.B.
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made a strong showing under normal standing requirements and
that the Court was applying relaxed footnote seven and special state
solicitude standards as well.31 1 The decision provides little or no
guidance to lower courts when they face a case in which it is unclear
whether a state has met normal standing requirements. It remains
to be seen whether the Court in the future will limit Massachusetts
to its facts, or perhaps to cases involving the CAA only, or if it will
apply a rule of special solicitude for state standing in many cases. 12
IV. DOES THE PARENS PATRIAE STANDING DOCTRINE SUPPORT
BROADER STANDING RIGHTS FOR STATES?
In Massachusetts, the majority relied heavily upon the right of
states to litigate as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign
interests, set out in Tennessee Copper, to justify greater standing
rights for states under the modern three-part constitutional
standing test.31 3 Chief Justice Roberts, however, argued that states
seeking to litigate as parens patriae have to meet additional
standing requirements and not lower standing requirements." 4 In
light of this disagreement, it will be helpful to carefully examine the
history and development of the parens patriae doctrine. Although
Chief Justice Roberts is correct that courts have sometimes limited
the doctrine, the broad principles underlying the right of states to
protect quasi-sovereign interests support the Court's giving greater
standing rights to states.
A. The HistoricalDevelopment of ParensPatriae
In its 1982 Snapp decision, the Supreme Court reviewed the
history and development of the parens patriae doctrine." 5 In the
311. See Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (majority opinion) (characterizing the case as
involving procedural rights); id. at 1454-55 (concluding that states in some circumstances are
entitled to special consideration when courts make standing decisions); id. at 1455-58
(arguing that plaintiffs had met three-part standing test); Cannon, supra note 149, at 57.
312. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 8 (discussing the possibility that the Supreme Court
in the future could limit Massachusetts to cases involving the Clean Air Act).
313. See Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1454-55 (majority opinion); supra Part III.A.2.
314. Id. at 1465 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); supraPart III.B.2.
315. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600-08
(1982).

20081

NEW STANDING TEST FOR STATES

1757

English common law, the king had the "royal prerogative" as parent
or father of the country, parens patriae, to act as guardian for those
who lacked the legal capacity to act for themselves, including
minors and the mentally disabled.3 16 After America became independent of England and its king, American courts recognized that
as parens
state legislatures or Congress had the prerogative to act
17
patriae for individuals unable to care for themselves.
B. ParensPatriaeand Quasi-sovereignInterests
Beginning in the early 1900s, the doctrine of parens patriae
evolved from the common law approach of protecting individuals
who lacked legal capacity to the quite different principle that a state
has standing to defend its quasi-sovereign interest in the "wellbeing of its populace."3 8 It is easiest to begin with what is not a
quasi-sovereign interest. The Snapp Court explained that "[q]uasisovereign interests ... are not sovereign interests, proprietary
interests, or private interests pursued by the State as a nominal
party."3 1 9 A state has a sovereign interest in the enforcement of its
laws or the recognition of its borders.3 2 ° A state has a proprietary
interest in the land or businesses it owns, much like "other similarly
situated proprietors."32 ' A state that is "only a nominal party
without a real interest of its own" does "not have standing under the
' None of these three types of interests can
parenspatriaedoctrine."3 22
be a quasi-sovereign interest.
Next, the Snapp Court tried to provide a definition of a quasisovereign interest. The Court stated, "[Quasi-sovereign interests]
consist of a set of interests that the State has in the well-being of its
populace."32' 3 The Court declared that standing principles limit the
316. Id. at 600; see also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); Estados
Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 335 n.4 (1st Cir. 2000).
317. E.g., Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600; Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890);
Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S (17 How.) 369, 384 (1854); Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 229 F.3d
at 335 n.4; Comment, supra note 203, at 1072.
318. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602; see also Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4).
319. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602; see also Watts & Wildermuth, supranote 4 (manuscript at 3).
320. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
321. Id. at 601-02; see also Watts & Wildermuth, supranote 4 (manuscript at 3).
322. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600.
323. Id. at 602.
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scope of which quasi-sovereign interests are actionable in federal
courts. The Court stated, "Formulated so broadly, the concept risks
being too vague to survive the standing requirements of Art. III: A
quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently concrete to create an
actual controversy between the State and the defendant. 3 24 The
Court acknowledged that this limitation was far from clear, stating,
'The vagueness of this concept can only be filled in by turning to
individual cases. 32 5
Quasi-sovereign interests include two different categories.
According to the Snapp Court, "First, a State has a quasi-sovereign
interest in the health and well-being-both physical and economic
-of its residents in general., 326 As to the first category, the Court
has never established any specific requirements as to "the proportion of the population of the State that must be adversely
affected by the challenged behavior. '32 7 The Court explained,
"Although more must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group
of individual residents, the indirect effects of the injury must be
considered as well in determining whether the State has alleged
injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population. 3 28
Furthermore,
One helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury
to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State
standing to sue as parenspatriaeis whether the injury is one
that the State, if it could, would likely329attempt to address
through its sovereign lawmaking powers
rather than through "private bills" designed to assist "particular
individuals. 3 ° Massachusetts' interest in protecting its coastline
affects the welfare of a large number of its citizens and, therefore,
is an appropriate quasi-sovereign interest.
According to the Snapp Court, the second type of parens patriae
suit involves a state's "quasi-sovereign interest in not being
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 607 n.14.
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discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal
system."33' 1 The Court explained, "Distinct from but related to the
general well-being of its residents, the State has an interest in
securing observance of the terms under which it participates in the
federal system. '332 For example, a state can sue another state that
imposes barriers to trade in violation of the Commerce Clause.3 3 3 A
state can sue another state or private firm for violating a federal
statute that provides benefits to the state's citizens as long as the
state is "more than a nominal party. '33 4 The Snapp Court concluded
that "a State does have an interest, independent of the benefits
that might accrue to any particular individual, in assuring that
the benefits of the federal system are not denied to its general
population. ' 3 5 As discussed below, the second type of parens patriae
is arguably justification for parens patriae suits by states against
the federal government if the executive branch is failing to enforce
a federal
law, although the Snapp decision did not allow such
336
suits.
C. ParensPatriaeand Suits To Enjoin PublicNuisances
The earliest successful parens patriae cases involved suits to
enjoin public nuisances. 337 Public nuisance cases are the most
analogous parens patriae cases compared to the global warming suit
in Massachusetts.3 8 In its 1901 decision, Missouri v. Illinois, the
331. Id. at 607.
332. Id. at 607-08.
333. Id. at 608 (citing Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923)).
334. Id. (citing Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (federal antitrust laws);
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (Natural Gas Act)).
335. Id.
336. See infra Part IV.H.
337. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 603-05 (listing and discussing parens patriae cases involving
suits to enjoin public nuisances); see also North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923)
(flooding); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (diversion of water); New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (water pollution); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907) (air pollution); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (diversion of water); Kansas v.
Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (diversion of water); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901)
(water pollution).
338. See David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate
Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3-5 (2003); Mank, supra note 266, at 197-98;
Merrill, supra note 5, at 328-33. But see Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265,
268, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing a public nuisance suit by eight state attorneys general
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Court considered Missouri's request for an injunction to enjoin
Illinois from discharging sewage that polluted the Mississippi River
in Missouri."3 9 The Missouri Court declared that a state could sue to
protect the health of its citizens:
It is true that no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct
property rights belonging to the complainant State. But it must
surely be conceded that, if the health and comfort of the
inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper
party to represent and defend them.34 °
The Missouri Court "relied upon an analogy to independent
countries in order to delineate those interests that a State could
pursue in federal court as parenspatriae,apart from its sovereign
and proprietary interests."3 4' 1 The Court stated:
If Missouri were an independent and sovereign State all must
admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that
failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war
having been surrendered to the general government, it was to be
expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of
providing a remedy and that remedy, we think, is found in the
constitutional provisions we are considering.342
The Tennessee Copper Court followed Missouri's approach of
justifying state parens patriae suits for quasi-sovereign interests
as a substitute for the sovereign interests that states surrender
when they join the United States.3 43 Additionally, Tennessee Copper
expanded the scope of quasi-sovereign interests protected by parens
patriae suits from protecting the health of their citizens from public
against five large public utilities as violating the political question doctrine).
339. 180 U.S. 208 (1901). In a subsequent case, the Court denied Missouri's request for an
injunction without prejudice because it was unclear whether the typhoid bacillus in the
sewage survived the journey from Illinois to Missouri and there was evidence of other possible
infection in other sewage sources, including towns in Missouri, but the Court left it open to
Missouri to submit additional evidence addressing whether Illinois was the source of the
alleged disease. Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri11), 200 U.S. 496, 521-26 (1906).
340. Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241.
341. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 603.
342. Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241.
343. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
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nuisances to safeguarding their land, air, and natural resources. 4 4
The Tennessee Copper Court stated:
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of
quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the
earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its
inhabitants shall breathe pure air.... When the States by their
union made the forcible abatement of outside nuisances
impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to
whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility
of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still
remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force
is a suit in this court. 45

Thus, even though Georgia owned very little of the affected land,
it still had a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the land and
natural resources within its borders, as well as the health of its
citizens.3 46 The Court stated that the evidence of harm to the state's
natural resources alone was sufficient to require injunctive relief to
protect the state's quasi-sovereign interests: "[W]e are satisfied by
a preponderance of evidence that the sulphurous fumes cause and
threaten damage on so considerable a scale to the forests and
vegetable life, if not to health, within the plaintiff State as to
make out a case within the requirements of Missouri.,,347 Because
Tennessee Copper recognized that a state has a quasi-sovereign

344. See id.; Ricard Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the
Tobacco Litigation,and the Doctrineof Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1867 (2000) ("In
Georgia ex rel. Hart v. Tennessee Copper Co., a state's quasi-sovereign interest was extended
beyond the general concepts of the health and comfort of its citizens to specifically include
interests in the land on which they reside and in the air that they breathe."); Allan Kanner,
The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as the Guardianof the
State's NaturalResources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 57, 107 (2005) ('The Supreme Court,
observing that the state owned very little of the property alleged to be damaged, recast the
state's claim as a suit for injury to resources owned by Georgia in its capacity of 'quasisovereign."').
345. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237 (citing Missouri, 180 U.S. at 241).
346. See id. at 238-39; Kanner, supra note 344.
347. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 238-39; see also Kanner, supranote 344.
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interest in protecting its natural resources, Massachusetts has a
similar quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its coastline.3 4 8
Chief Justice Roberts is technically correct that the Tennessee
Copper decision only gave states greater remedies than private
individuals and did not address the issue of standing. 49 The absence
of standing language in Tennessee Copper is not surprising because
the Court did not create a standing doctrine until 1944.350 The
Tennessee Copper Court's underlying reasoning, however, was based
on the broader principle that states are entitled to broader rights
than individuals because of the quasi-sovereign rights they retain
as a limited substitute for their former full sovereign rights.3 5 '
These broader principles are consistent with the Massachusetts
Court's decision to grant states broader standing rights than
individuals. 5 2
D. ParensPatriaeActions Other than Public Nuisances
Although the first parens patriae cases involved public nuisances,
the Snapp Court observed that "parenspatriae interests extend
well beyond the prevention of such traditional public nuisances."''
The Court in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia in 1923 allowed
Pennsylvania to represent the quasi-sovereign interests of its
residents in maintaining access to natural gas produced in West
Virginia."' The Pennsylvania Court stated:

348. See Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (D. Me. 1973) (holding that a state
has a quasi-sovereign interest in coastal resources); Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350
F. Supp. 1060, 1065-67 (D. Md. 1972) (allowing a state to file a parens patriae suit to recover
damages to coastal waters from an oil spill); State v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d
750, 758 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (allowing a state to file a parens patriae suit to
recover damages for fish kill), rev'd on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976); Ieyoub &
Eisenberg, supra note 344, at 1869-70 & n.56 (discussing the state quasi-sovereign interest
in natural resources, including coastal resources); Kanner, supra note 344, at 107-09
(discussing the state quasi-sovereign interest in natural resources).
349. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1465 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting);
supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
350. See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288,310 (1944) (becoming the first Supreme Court case
to explicitly state the Article III standing requirements); supranote 9 and accompanying text.
351. See Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237.
352. See Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1454-55 (majority opinion); infra Part IV.G.
353. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 605 (1982).
354. 262 U.S. 553, 581, 591 (1923).
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The private consumers in each State ... constitute a substantial
portion of the State's population. Their health, comfort and
welfare are seriously jeopardized by the threatened withdrawal
of the gas from the interstate stream. This is a matter of grave
public concern in which the State, as representative of the
public, has an interest apart from that of the individuals
affected. It is not merely a remote or ethical interest but one
which is immediate and recognized by law. 55
In its 1945 decision, Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., the
Court held that Georgia could bring a parens patriae suit to protect
state residents from alleged antitrust violations because the
economic harms at issue were as important as the issues in public
nuisance cases like Tennessee Copper or Missouri.3 " The Court
stated:
If the allegations of the bill are taken as true, the economy of
Georgia and the welfare of her citizens have seriously suffered
as the result of this alleged conspiracy.... [Trade barriers] may
cause a blight no less serious than the spread of noxious gas over
the land or the deposit of sewage in the streams.... These are
matters of grave public concern in which Georgia has an interest
apart from that of particular individuals who may be affected.5 7
In the economic injury parens patriae cases, the state's suit was not
based on its own injuries, but instead as the representative of its
citizens for their injuries.5 8

355. Id. at 592.
356. 324 U.S. 439, 443-44, 450-51 (1945).
357. Id. at 450-51.
358. States can sue if they suffer individual injuries, but parens patriae actions are based
solely on states acting in a representative capacity for their citizens' interests. See Maryland
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 737-39 (1981) (authorizing parens patriae suit for states to
challenge "first use" tax imposed by Louisiana on certain uses of natural gas where "a great
many citizens in each of the plaintiff States are themselves consumers of natural gas and are
faced with increased costs aggregating millions of dollars per year"). A state can sue both in
its individual capacity and as parens patriae, but the Supreme Court has treated such suits
as analytically separate. See id.
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E. Justice Brennan's Broader ConcurringOpinion in Snapp
In his concurring opinion in Snapp, Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, stated: "At the very
least, the prerogative of a State to bring suits in federal court should
be commensurate with the ability of private organizations."35' 9 He
then implied that states should have greater rights than
individuals:
More significantly, a State is no ordinary litigant. As a sovereign
entity, a State is entitled to assess its needs, and decide which
concerns of its citizens warrant its protection and intervention.
I know of nothing--except the Constitution or overriding federal
law-that might lead a federal court to superimpose its
judgment for that of a State with respect to the substantiality or
legitimacy of a State's assertion of sovereign interest.36 °
Although he does not explicitly declare that states have greater
standing rights than individuals, his argument that federal
courts should normally defer to a state's "assertion of sovereign
interests" would effectively give states greater standing rights than
individuals, although not automatic standing. Presumably, Justice
Brennan meant to include quasi-sovereign interests along with
sovereign interests because the Snapp decision was primarily
concerned with quasi-sovereign interests and not purely sovereign
interests.
F. Standing in Public Nuisance Cases
The traditional rule in public nuisance cases is that the state has
automatic standing as a sovereign.36 ' Courts viewed public nuisance
359. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 611 (1982)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Four justices did not join his concurrence: Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White, who wrote the majority opinion, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Id. at 594 (majority
opinion). Justice Powell did not participate in the case. Id. at 610.
360. Id. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring).
361. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 438 N.E.2d 159, 162 (Ill. 1982)
("Equitable jurisdiction to abate public nuisances is said to be of 'ancient origin,' and it exists
even where not conferred by statute ....
); see also Grossman, supra note 338, at 55; David
Kairys, The GovernmentalHandgun Casesand the Elements and UnderlyingPoliciesof Public
Nuisance Law, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1175, 1177 n.9 (2000); Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A.
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cases as quasi-criminal in nature, and states have always had
automatic standing in criminal cases.3 62 Thus, a court might
presume that a state in a public nuisance case has standing.
Perhaps that presumption explains why early Supreme Court cases
like Missouri and Tennessee Copper do not question the right of
states to bring suit.
Professor Merrill argues that the issue of whether states deserve
automatic standing in public nuisance cases is more complicated
when a state brings an action in the courts of another sovereign, the
federal courts.363 As a matter of theory, based on the principle that
states can only bring criminal actions in their own courts, he would
prefer that states should only bring public nuisance actions in their
own courts because they are quasi-criminal in nature,3 64 but he
concedes that "it is almost certainly too late in the day to advance
any general rule that public nuisance actions, like criminal actions,
must always be brought in the courts of the sovereign that institutes
the action."3 6 As an alternative, he proposes a rule whereby states
would have automatic standing when they bring parens patriae
suits in their own courts, but would apply "the same Article III and
prudential standing limitations that apply to suits by aggrieved

Krass, Behind the Curve: The NationalMedia'sReportingon Global Warming, 33 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF, L. REV. 485, 489-90 (2006). However, Professors Woolhandler and Collins argue that
during the nineteenth century, federal courts would not have granted automatic standing to
states filing nuisance suits in a federal court, but would have required the state to
demonstrate 'particularized' or special injury," the same as any private individual. Ann
Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 432-33 (1995)
(discussing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 559
(1851)). They acknowledge that federal courts by the early 1900s did grant automatic standing
to states filing suit in federal courts under a parens patriae theory. Id. at 446-47 (citing
Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241, 244 (1901)).
362. See Grossman, supra note 338, at 55; Paws & Krass, supra note 361, at 489-90;
Merrill, supranote 5, at 300-01, 304.
363. Merrill, supranote 5, at 302-04; Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 45) (discussing Professor Merrill's proposal that states should not have automatic standing
when they file public nuisance suits in federal courts).
364. See Merrill, supra note 5, at 301-03.
365. Id. at 303.
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citizens" to states when they bring such actions in federal courts.3 66
Yet he acknowledges:
There is no suggestion from the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction cases adjudicating transboundary nuisance disputes
-the paradigm for the modern parenspatriaeaction-that the
States bringing these suits were required to meet any particular
standing burden in order to maintain the action. One could
attempt to distinguish these cases on the grounds that today's
elaborate standing doctrine, requiring injury in fact, causation,
redressability and so forth, is a relatively recent development
that postdates the decisions in these transboundary cases.
Moreover, it is quite likely that if in fact one were to apply
modern standing requirements to these transboundary suits, the
States would have been able to establish standing in each of
these cases. Still, the absence of any discussion in these cases
that even sounds like the Court was considering a standing
requirement makes it substantially more difficult to maintain
that traditional standing notions should be turned on or off
depending on whether public officers are suing in the courts of
their own sovereign." 7
Although he personally disagrees with automatic standing in
parens patriae cases, Professor Merrill concedes that the Missouri
and Tennessee Copper decisions appear to have granted states
standing by right in parens patriae actions.36 His analysis strongly
suggests that the Massachusetts Court was closer to the spirit of
those two decisions than Chief Justice Roberts' dissenting opinion.

366. Id. at 304-05; Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 4-5) (agreeing with
Merrill that states should not have automatic standing when they file public nuisance suits
in federal courts). Federal courts followed Merrill's approach of not giving states automatic
standing in nuisance suits in the federal courts during the nineteenth century; but by the
early 1900s they were granting states automatic standing under the parens patriae doctrine.
See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 361, at 432-33 (citing Wheeling & Belmont Bridge, 54
U.S. (13 How.) at 561; id. at 446-47 (citing Missouri, 180 U.S. at 240-41, 244).
367. Merrill, supra note 5, at 305-06 (footnotes omitted).
368. See id. at 302-06.
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G. States Are Entitled to GreaterStandingRights in Parens
PatriaeCases Involving Quasi-sovereignInterests
Because the parens patriae doctrine gives states the right to
protect a broad range of interests that affect the health, safety,
welfare, and economics of their citizens, it is reasonable to give
states broader latitude in obtaining standing for generalized
injuries that affect many of their citizens. Courts have recognized
parens patriae standing for mass torts and consumer fraud.36 9
Indeed, courts may properly deny parens patriae standing if a suit
involves only a few injured individuals because those individuals
could bring their own lawsuit and thus the state is only a nominal
party.3 7 ° States are the ideal party to bring a suit challenging global
warming because such generalized harms affect the welfare of many
of their citizens and the state is in a better position to represent
their common interests than any group of individuals. Professor
Merrill argues "that the State's interest in protecting the health and
wellbeing of its citizens from transboundary nuisances is the
paradigm case of a73quasi-sovereign
interest that will supportparens
1
patriaestanding.
Following Justice Holmes' broad reasoning in Tennessee Copper,
the Massachusetts Court made a strong argument that states are
entitled to greater latitude concerning standing to protect their
quasi-sovereign interests. 2 The Supreme Court has long recognized
that states have a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting their water
resources.373 Lower court decisions have specifically concluded that
369. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 737-39 (1981) (authorizing parens patriae
suit for states to challenge "First Use Tax" imposed by Louisiana on certain uses of natural
gas where "a great many citizens in each of the plaintiff States are themselves consumers of
natural gas and are faced with increased costs aggregating millions of dollars per year");
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907) (allowing Georgia to bring public
nuisance suit on behalf of numerous citizens affected by air pollution); Ieyoub & Eisenberg,
supra note 344, at 1870; Kenneth Juan Figueroa, Note, Immigrants and the Civil Rights
Regime: Parens Patriae Standing, Foreign Governments and Protection from Private
Discrimination,102 COLUM. L. REV. 408, 436 n.146 (2002).
370. See supra notes 319-22, 334 and accompanying text.
371. Merrill, supra note 5, at 304.
372. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454-55 (2007) (majority opinion).
373. See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (flooding); Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (diversion of water); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296
(1921) (water pollution); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (diversion of water); Kansas
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states have a quasi-sovereign interest in their coastal waters and
the biological and natural resources associated with them.37 4
Massachusetts has a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its
coastline from global warming and should have standing to protect
it in the federal courts.
Although neither the Missouri nor Tennessee Copper decisions
directly involved standing, the Court in those parens patriae
decisions implicitly gave states broader standing rights by allowing
a state to obtain broad remedies for a public nuisance without
requiring them to prove the specific injuries required in suits by
individual litigants, who must prove direct and particularized harm
to themselves. In Tennessee Copper, Justice Holmes acknowledged
that the Court granted equitable relief to Georgia that it might well
not have given to private litigants. He stated:
If any such demand [for equitable relief] is to be enforced this
must be, notwithstanding the hesitation that we might feel if the
suit were between private parties, and the doubt whether for the
injuries which they might be suffering to their property they
should not be left to an action at law.375
According to the First Circuit, the parens patriae doctrine "creates
an exception to the normal rules of standing applied to private
citizens in recognition of the special role that a State plays in
pursuing its quasi-sovereign interests in the 'well-being of its
populace. ''3 76

v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (diversion of water); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901)
(water pollution).
374. See supra note 348.

375. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907).
376. Estados Unidos Mexicanos v. DeCoster, 229 F.3d 332, 335 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982)). The First
Circuit qualified this statement by stating that "[i]t is a judicially created exception that has
been narrowly construed." Id.
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H. Can States File ParensPatriaeSuits Against the Federal
Government?
Following Massachusetts v. Mellon,377 Chief Justice Roberts
argued that a state may not assert a quasi-sovereign interest
against the federal government.37 8 The Mellon decision held that
states may not sue the federal government in a parens patriae
capacity because the federal government is in the position of parens
patriae, for those same citizens are both federal and state citizens.3 79
[T]he citizens of Massachusetts are also citizens of the United
States. It cannot be conceded that a State, as parenspatriae,
may institute judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the
United States from the operation of the statutes thereof. While
the State, under some circumstances, may sue in that capacity
for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or power
to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the
Federal Government. In that field it is the United States, and
not the State, which represents them as parenspatriae,when
such representation becomes appropriate; and to the former, and
not to the latter, they must look for such protective measures as
flow from that status.3
A footnote in the 1982 Alfred L. Snapp & Son decision expressed
agreement with the Mellon decision that states cannot file parens
patriae suits against the federal government."8 ' Professors Watts
and Wildermuth also agree with Mellon's reasoning and argue that
[blecause a state's quasi-sovereign interests are based on
protecting "the well-being of its populace," it seems to follow that
a state would not be permitted to bring suit as parenspatriae
against the federal government because the federal government
is not only charged with the same obligation to protect those
377. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
378. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1466 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(citing Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86).
379. See Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86.
380. Id. (internal citation omitted).
381. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,610 n.16 (1982)
("A State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal
Government." (citing Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86 (1923))).
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residents, but it typically
stands in a superior position to that of
382
the states to do so.

The majority opinion distinguished Mellon by limiting it to its
facts involving a suit to prevent the application of federal tax laws
in Massachusetts. Justice Stevens stated that "there is a critical
difference between allowing a State 'to protect her citizens from the
operation of federal statutes' (which is what Mellon prohibits) and
allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law (which it
has standing to do). 383 Accordingly, the Court concluded that
Massachusetts properly asserted its quasi-sovereign interest to
require the federal government to enforce the CAA. 3 ' The majority
opinion cited a 1995 parens patriae case in which the Court allowed
a cross-claim against the United States as evidence that it did not
prohibit parens patriae suits by states against the federal
government in all circumstances; however, that case did not discuss
or distinguish Mellon or Snapp."5
Although not discussed by the Massachusetts majority, several
lower court decisions have treated the Snapp footnote as dicta and
allowed states to file parens patriae suits against the federal
government to require the government to enforce rights in a federal
statute on behalf of their citizens, which is consistent with the
reasoning of the majority in Massachusetts. 386 While serving on
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, then-Judge Scalia authored an
382. Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 5-6).
383. Massachusetts,127 S. Ct. at 1455 n.17 (majority opinion).
384. See id.
385. See id. (citing Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 20 (1995) (holding that Wyoming had
standing to bring a cross-claim against the United States "to vindicate its 'quasi-sovereign'
interests which are 'independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and
air within its domain')).
386. See, e.g., Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 369 F. Supp. 2d
237, 245 n.8 (D. Conn. 2005) (treating the Snapp footnote as dicta and allowing a state to
bring parens patriae suit against the federal government); P.R. Pub. Hous. Admin. v. U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 59 F. Supp. 2d 310, 326 (D.P.R. 1999); Kansas v. United States,
748 F. Supp. 797, 802 (D. Kan. 1990) (allowing a state to bring parens patriae suit against the
federal government); Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155, 1159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (treating
the Snapp footnote as dicta and allowing a state to bring parens patriae suit against the
federal government); Comment, supra note 203, at 1089-93. But see State ex rel. Sullivan v.
Lujan, 969 F.2d 877, 883 (10th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Snapp to bar all parens patriae suits
by state against federal government); Nevada v. Burford, 918 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1990);
Iowa v. Block, 771 F.2d 347, 354-55 (8th Cir. 1985).
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opinion allowing a Maryland commission to file suit as parens
patriae against the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission because
he concluded that Mellon's limitation of parens patriae suits against
the federal government was only a prudential limitation on standing
subject to congressional override rather than a constitutional
prohibition against standing. He determined that the statute
implicitly authorized parens patriae suits when it authorized suits
by states or their commissions even though it was unlikely that a
state would have an interest in natural gas as a purchaser." 7 Judge
Scalia stated that, at least in some circumstances, Congress can
override Mellon's limitation of parens patriae suits against the
federal government, including "where the subject of challenge is
Executive compliance with statutory requirements in a field where
the federal government and the states have long shared regulatory
responsibility; we have no doubt that congressional elimination
of the rule of Massachusetts v. Mellon is effective."3 ' Because,
following Justice Scalia's reasoning, the Clean Air Act is premised
upon shared responsibility between states and the federal
government,38 9 it was reasonable for the Massachusetts majority to
conclude that Congress implicitly allowed states to bring parens
patriae suits against the EPA for allegedly failing to comply with
the Act. The dissenting justices in Massachusetts might respond
that the Clean Air Act does not contain any language clearly
overriding Mellon's limitation of parens patriae suits against the
federal government, but the purpose of the Act in enhancing air
quality for the public would be enhanced if states can file parens
patriae suits against the executive branch for any alleged failures
to comply with the statute.
This Article agrees with the Massachusetts majority that states
should be able to file parens patriae suits on behalf of its citizens
against the federal government if the federal government has
allegedly failed to perform a statutory or constitutional duty. In
theory, the Mellon decision is correct that the federal government
387. Md. People's Counsel v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 760 F.2d 318, 320-22 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
388. Id. at 322.
389. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407-10 (2000) (giving the U.S. EPA responsibility for
establishing national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) and states primary
responsibility for implementation of NAAQS).
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ought to act as parens patriae on behalf of each state's citizens to
secure their rights under federal laws and that, if that is the case,
there is no need for state suits against the federal government. The
reality is, however, that the executive branch does not always
appropriately enforce federal laws. The Snapp decision authorizes
states to sue on behalf of their citizens if they are denied federal
rights, observing that
the State has an interest in securing observance of the terms
under which it participates in the federal system. In the context
of parenspatriae actions, this means ensuring that the State
and its residents are not excluded from the benefits that are to
flow from participation in the federal system.3 90
Although a footnote in Snapp declared that states cannot file parens
patriae suits against the federal government, 39' the broader reasoning of Snapp suggests that states should be able to file such suits
if the federal government fails to protect the rights of the state's
citizens."'
Professors Watts and Wildermuth observe that the Massachusetts
Court provides a confusing explanation of why states can file parens
patriae suits against the federal government by stating that
Massachusetts was protecting its own rights rather than those of its
citizens:
Instead of explaining its result by, for example, reasoning that
sovereigns need to be able to protect their residents from the
federal government in the complicated modern federal
administrative system, the Court insists that the difference in
this case is that a state may not sue the federal government
based on its interest in protecting its citizens but it may sue the
federal government "when it assert[s] its [own] rights under
federal law." That sounds like the assertion of a sovereign
interest, i.e., where the federal legislation directly operates on
390. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607-08 (1982).
391. Id. at 610 n.16.
392. See id. at 607-08; Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 7) ("[G]iven the
Court's observation that the federal government has an obligation to protect Massachusetts
under the CAA, the state's interest could be in protecting its residents by 'securing observance
of the terms under which it participates in the federal system.- (footnote omitted)).
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a state and the state asserts its own legally protected interest in
response. As we noted above, there is no bar to suing the federal
government when a state asserts a sovereign interest. But the
Court specifically identified Massachusetts's relevant interest as
a quasi-sovereign interest, not a sovereign interest.39 3
Professors Watts and Wildermuth convincingly argue that the
confusion likely arises from the statement in Snapp that "[a] State
has a quasi-sovereign interest in not being discriminatorily denied
' This language is
its rightful status within the federal system."3 94
misleading because it is clear that the Court's cases on quasisovereign interests always refer to an interest related to a state's
residents rather than simply the state's own interest. They observe
that all of the cases cited by Snapp involve the protection of state
residents and not the state itself.395 Furthermore, the Snapp
decision then accurately characterizes the quasi-sovereign interest
as "'assuring that the benefits of the federal system are not denied
to its general population"' rather than to the state's interests.3 96
Accordingly, they conclude that "it is clear that quasi-sovereign
'
The
interests must always relate back to a state's residents."3 97
that
more
clearly
stated
should
have
Massachusetts decision
Massachusetts has a right to file parens patriae suits against the
federal government because of the interests of its residents in
protecting its coastline from the impacts of global warming, rather
than because of the proprietary interest of the Commonwealth in
those portions of its coastline that it owns-which is a proprietary
interest similar to a private owner or possibly a sovereign interest
in its borders, but is not a quasi-sovereign interest.3 9 8 The
Massachusettsconclusion that states ought to have greater standing
rights to defend their quasi-sovereign interest in the health,
welfare, and natural resources of their citizens is correct even if the
Court's reliance in part on the Commonwealth's ownership of some
393.
127 S.
394.
395.

Watts & Wildermuth, supranote 4 (manuscript at 8) (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA,
Ct. 1438, 1455 n.17 (2007) (footnote omitted)).
Id. at 8 (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607).
Id. at 9.

396. Id. (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608).
397. Id. at 9.
398. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600-02 (defining proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-sovereign
interests); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript at 3-7); supra Part III.C.1.
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of the property is contrary to the rationale for allowing states
greater rights in parens patriae suits.
I. Limits on ParensPatriaeSuits
A weakness of the Massachusetts decision is that it does not
3 99
provide any guidelines on the limits of special standing for states.
The Snapp Court broadly defined quasi-sovereign interests to
include any issue that affects the "well-being of [a state's] populace,"
but warned that because this definition was "[flormulated so
broadly, the concept risks being too vague to survive the standing
requirements of Art. III.04' ° The Akins decision provides limits on
Article III suits by requiring a concrete injury if a plaintiff asserts
an injury that affects the population at large.4 °1 The Massachusetts
decision concluded that the injuries to Massachusetts' coastline from
40 2
global warming were sufficiently concrete to meet the Akins test.
In the future, courts should not give special standing to states if the
alleged injuries are trivial, only affect a few individuals who could
sue themselves, or are non-concrete generalized injuries that fail the
Akins test. In all other cases, courts should give special standing to
states.
One issue not addressed by the Court is whether relaxed standing
for states will result in states filing more suits within the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction. 4 3 For many years, the Court has
sought to restrict the number of cases it hears within its original
jurisdiction to those involving two or more states and has exercised
399. See supra Part III.C.1.
400. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602.
401. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998).
402. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 1456 (2007) (majority opinion).
403. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.2 (stating Supreme Court shall have "original
Jurisdiction" in cases "in which a State shall be a Party"); 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000) ("(A) The
Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two
or more States. (B) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of:
(1) All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, or vice
consuls of foreign states are parties; (2) All controversies between the United States and a
State; (3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State or against
aliens."); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 292-93 & n.6 (5th ed. 2003)

(asking whether the Supreme Court might want to restrict state standing to avoid too many
suits within its original jurisdiction).
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its discretion not to hear cases involving states and non-state
parties.4 "4 One solution would be to apply relaxed standing only
when a state files suit in district court and to deny relaxed standing
if a state seeks to sue within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.4 °5
V. A PROPOSED STANDING TEST: RELAXING THE IMMEDIACY AND
REDRESSABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR STATES

The MassachusettsCourt failed to explain when or to what extent
courts should relax standing requirements for states. Using the
Court's footnote seven procedural rights standing test as a model,
this Article proposes to relax the immediacy and redressability
requirements of the standing test when states file parens patriae
suits to protect the health, welfare, or natural resources of their
citizens. The Court's historic decisions in Missouri and Tennessee
Copper support this test.
The Missouri decision supports relaxing the immediacy requirement for states. In granting injunctive relief, the Missouri Court
considered not just the actual harms from the sewage, but also the
potential risks:
The health and comfort of the large communities inhabiting
those parts of the State situated on the Mississippi [R]iver are
not alone concerned, but contagious and typhoidal diseases
introduced in the river communities may spread themselves
throughout the territory of the State. Moreover, substantial
impairment of the health and prosperity of the towns and cities
of the state situated on the Mississippi [R]iver, including its

404. See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 497-99 (1971) (denying a
state's motion for leave to file suit within the Court's original jurisdiction and stating as a
matter of policy that the Court should exercise discretion to limit original jurisdiction suits
because of "the diminished societal concern in our function as a court of original jurisdiction
and the enhanced importance of our role as the final federal appellate court"); FALLON ET AL.,
supra note 403, at 280, 294-304 (discussing cases in which the Court exercised discretion to
decline original jurisdiction in favor of another forum).
405. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 403 (asking whether the Supreme Court should allow
broader standing if a state chooses to file parens patriae suit in district court rather than
within the Court's original jurisdiction).
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commercial metropolis, would injuriously affect the entire
state." 6

The Missouri Court's consideration of potential harms supports the
Massachusetts
Court's consideration of the future harms of global
warming. 407 Although Chief Justice Roberts could try to argue that
the potential harms in Missouri were more likely to occur than
those asserted in Massachusetts, the Massachusetts petitioners
presented far more scientific evidence in the computer models
supporting their assertions than was possible for plaintiffs to
present in 1901.408
The Tennessee Copper decision supports relaxing the redressability portion of the standing test for states. Chief Justice
Roberts acknowledges that the Tennessee Copper decision gave
states greater remedies than private individuals.4 "9 In Tennessee
Copper, Justice Holmes stated that Georgia could not meet the
normal requirements for equitable relief. He stated:
The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two
private parties; but it is not. The very elements that would be
relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for
equitable relief are wanting here. The State owns very little of
the territory alleged to be affected, and the damage to it capable
of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is small.41 °
The Tennessee Copper Court granted equitable relief nonetheless to
allow Georgia to protect its quasi-sovereign interests in its air and
its natural resources. Justice Holmes stated that states are entitled
to special deference in defending their quasi-sovereign interests:
If the State has a case at all, it is somewhat more certainly
entitled to specific relief than a private party might be. It is not
lightly to be required to give up quasi-sovereign rights for pay;
and, apart from the difficulty of valuing such rights in money, if
406. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
407. See supra Part III.A.3.
408. See supra Part III.A.3.
409. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1465 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); supra
note 183 and accompanying text.
410. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
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that be its choice it may insist that an infraction of them shall
be stopped. The States by entering the Union did not sink to the
position of private owners subject to one system of private law.
This court has not quite the same freedom to balance the harm
that will be done by an injunction against that of which the
plaintiff complains, that it would have in deciding between two
subjects of a single political power.4 11
The Tennessee Copper Court concluded that a state as a quasisovereign could demand equitable relief from pollution that affected
many of its citizens even if individuals could not sue:
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign
that the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great
scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains,
be they better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they
have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by
the act of persons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards
on its hills should not be endangered from the same source. If
any such demand is to be enforced this must be, notwithstanding
the hesitation that we might feel if the suit were between
private parties, and the doubt whether for the injuries which
they might be suffering to their property they should not be left
to an action at law.41 2
Because remedies and redressability are intertwined concepts, the
Tennessee Copper decision's preferential treatment of remedies for
states strongly supports relaxing the normal redressability
requirements for states.
Justice Holmes' broad language supports the approach taken in
Massachusettsthat states are entitled to greater redress in federal
court than individuals when they are protecting quasi-sovereign
interests, and broadly supports the principle that states need
greater standing rights to protect such quasi-sovereign interests. A
weakness of Justice Holmes' opinion is that he never defines how
much extra deference should be given to states compared to private
individuals. Probably the Tennessee Copper Court believed that it
would have to assess on a case-by-case basis how much additional
411. Id. at 237-38.
412. Id. at 238.
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deference to give to states regarding judicial remedies. The
inexactitude of the Tennessee Copper decision about how much
additional deference states deserve compared to individuals leads
to the same problem in Massachusetts, where the modern Court
relies on Tennessee Copper but never provides any additional
guidance on how much extra deference states deserve when courts
determine standing rights.
Read together, the Missouri and Tennessee Copper decisions
support relaxing the immediacy and redressability portions of the
modern standing test. These are the same two parts of the standing
test that footnote seven in Lujan recognized should be relaxed for
procedural rights plaintiffs.4 13 Accordingly, it makes sense to define
Massachusetts' special solicitude for state plaintiffs test in light of
footnote seven's more established jurisprudence. A significant
difference is that states would enjoy relaxed standing even when
they bring substantive claims. Many of the Court's parens patriae
cases were substantive claims, including the public nuisance issues
in Missouri and Tennessee Copper.
A more radical approach would be to abolish standing requirements for states whenever they assert quasi-sovereign interests in
a parens patriae suit.4 14 Although he believes that states should
have to meet Article III standing in federal courts, Professor Merrill
concedes: 'There is no suggestion from the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction cases adjudicating transboundary nuisance disputesthe paradigm for the modern parenspatriaeaction-that the States
bringing these suits were required to meet any particular standing
burden in order to maintain the action."4 5 Professors Woolhandler
and Collins, however, believe that at least some of the Court's early
parens patriae decisions required states to demonstrate "an interest
independent of [their] citzens," although they concede "that independent interest often seems attenuated."4 1' 6 The Snapp decision
implied that Article III limits the concept of quasi-sovereign
interests, but also provided a very broad definition of those

413. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
414. WELLS ET AL., supra note 189, at 38-39 (suggesting that a state's quasi-sovereign
interest alone is sufficient for standing).
415. Merrill, supra note 5, at 305.
416. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 361, at 511.
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interests.4 17 Abolishing standing requirements for states in parens
patriae suits would simplify such cases by eliminating the need to
address difficult standing issues such as injury, causation, and
redressability. The Massachusettsdecision implicitly assumed that
states must meet some standing requirements.4 1 It is unlikely that
the Court meant to abolish standing for states even if eliminating
all standing requirements would simplify the task left to lower
courts.
The Massachusettsdecision implied that states in parens patriae
suits are entitled to more lenient standing requirements. 419 Footnote
seven standing is the only existing example in which the Court has
adopted more lenient standing requirements, and therefore would
appear to be a logical starting point for inferring what the
Massachusetts majority had in mind when it concluded that states
are entitled to lower standing requirements."' One problem with
using footnote seven standing as an analogy for state standing is
that the Court has never fully defined the contours of the former
standing test. In light of the special solicitude that Massachusetts
gave to state standing in parens patriae cases, courts should
generally follow those lower court decisions that have liberally
interpreted footnote seven standing. For example, in state parens
patriae standing cases, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit's rule
that footnote seven plaintiffs "need only establish 'the reasonable
probability of the challenged action's threat to [their] concrete
interest"' rather than the D.C. Circuit's more restrictive four-part
test requiring a procedural rights plaintiff to demonstrate that it
is "substantially probable" that the agency action will cause a
demonstrable injury to a particularized interest of the plaintiff.4 '
Judge Sentelle concluded that the petitioners in Massachusetts
could not meet the standing requirements even under the relaxed
standing test for procedural rights plaintiffs because he followed
417. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982)
("Formulated so broadly, the concept [of a quasi-sovereign interest] risks being too vague to
survive the standing requirements of Art. III: A quasi-sovereign interest must be sufficiently
concrete to create an actual controversy between the State and the defendant."); Merrill,
supra note 5, at 304.
418. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454-55 (2007) (majority opinion).
419. See id.
420. See supraPart III.A.2.
421. See supra note 91.
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the D.C. Circuit's more restrictive test. 42 2 In light of the Supreme
Court's rejection of Judge Sentelle's approach to standing in
Massachusetts,it is more likely that the majority of the Court would
have followed the Ninth Circuit's more liberal approach to standing.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The relaxed standing rule for states in Massachusetts will make
it easier for states and state attorneys general (AGs) to file suit in
federal courts.4 23 State AGs generally possess a "monopoly, or a near
monopoly, on the state executive branch's access to the courtroom,"
although the governor or state legislature may have some influence
through legal, budgetary, or political intervention.4 2 4 Decisions that
recognize that states have broad authority to file parens patriae
suits generally expand the power of state AGs to file lawsuits.4 25
The Massachusettsdecision will encourage states and state AGs to
file suits against the federal government in particular, although
46
several lower court decisions had already allowed such suits.
Additionally, states and state AGs may file more parens patriae
suits in general, including mass tort claims, consumer protection
suits, or natural resource damages claims.42 7

422. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50,59-60 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in judgment) (citing Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C.
Cir. 1996)), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
423. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 38; Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 4 (manuscript
at 8) ("The more lenient Lujan-lite analysis that courts apparently are now to apply when
states assert a quasi-sovereign interest may well give states a strategic incentive to assert
quasi-sovereign interests, even though the analysis will still turn on their proprietary
interests."). See generallyRichard Blumenthal, The Role of State Attorneys General,33 CONN.
L. REV. 1207 (2001); Roundtable: State Attorney General Litigation: Regulation Through
Litigation and the Separation of Powers, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 617 (2001) [hereinafter
Roundtable]; Symposium, The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental
Policy, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 335 (2005).
424. Timothy Meyer, Comment, Federalismand Accountability: State Attorneys General,
Regulatory Litigation,and the New Federalism,95 CAL. L. REV. 885, 890-95 (2007).
425. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 344, at 1875-76 (arguing broad parens patriae
doctrine leads to more suits by state AGs); Kanner, supra note 344, at 112-15.
426. See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
427. See Ieyoub & Eisenberg, supra note 344, at 1875-83 (arguing broad parens patriae
doctrine leads to more mass tort and consumer protection suits by state AGs, including suits
against the tobacco industry); Kanner, supra note 344, at 107-15 (arguing broad parens
patriae doctrine leads to more natural resource damages suits by state AGs).
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A parens patriae suit by a state AG is often a more effective way
to protect the public interest of state residents than individual suits
by private individuals, including suits against the federal
government.4 2 A state in a parens patriae suit may be able to secure
broader relief and represent a broader range of interests than a suit
by individuals, even if those individuals file a class action.4 29
Traditionally, public nuisance suits by government officials were
accorded presumptive validity by courts and therefore were subject
to lesser standing-like requirements than private nuisance suits,
in which individual plaintiffs had to prove special injury.43 ° In
Tennessee Copper, Justice Holmes provided broad equitable relief to
Georgia that was unavailable to private litigants, and stated that
the Court weighed the equities in granting injunctive relief to a
state to protect its quasi-sovereign interest in its natural resources
differently than if two private individuals were involved in a suit.4 31
In Massachusetts,it is unclear whether the Court would have been
willing to allow private individuals to secure the same relief against
the EPA that the Court granted to Massachusetts.
Additionally, it is generally less costly for the state AG to file one
lawsuit than for dozens of private individuals to file suit, although
the cost of private suits may be reduced if they are filed as a class
action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or by an organization representing a large number of members.43 2 In some cases,
428. See Comment, supra note 203, at 1101 ("A state could thereby mobilize its powerful
legal resources, including ample funding and staffing, on behalf of its citizens when they are
harmed by federal agency action, rather than let the burden fall upon individual injured
parties whose resources may be inadequate for the task.").
429. See id. at 1103-09 (comparing parens patriae suits with class action suits and arguing
that parens patriae suits have several advantages).
430. See David R. Hodas, PrivateActions for PublicNuisance: Common Law Citizen Suits
for Relieffrom EnvironmentalHarm, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883, 883-84 (1989); Merrill, supranote
5, at 301 & n.35.
431. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907); supratext accompanying notes
15, 21.
432. See generally Kanner, supra note 344, at 112-15 (stressing the efficiency of suits by
state AGs); Comment, supra note 203, at 1103-09 (comparing parens patriae suits with class
action suits and arguing that parens patriae suits have several advantages). But see FALLON
ET AL., supra note 403, at 292 ("Is the state a better or worse representative of others than,
for example, a class representative under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23, or an organizational plaintiff
suing on behalf of its members?"). One potential disadvantage of parens patriae suits is that
they will ordinarily preclude separate claims by citizens who were represented by the state.
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state AGs have controversially contracted with private attorneys on
either an hourly fee or contingent fee basis to file suit if the state
433
AG lacks the resources or expertise to file a particular type of suit.
There was controversy in litigation involving the tobacco industry
about the size of the contingency fees and the secrecy in some states
about the size of the fees and how the AG selected the private
attorneys.43 4 For example, Minnesota Attorney General Humphrey
stated that his office lacked sufficient attorneys and expertise in
without the assistance of
civil litigation to sue the tobacco industry
4 35
private attorneys that his office hired.
A state AG can also ally with her colleagues in other states to
reduce costs or to increase the level of legal or technical expertise for
the plaintiffs, as in the Massachusettslitigation, where twelve state
AGs joined as petitioners. 43 6 For instance, Connecticut Attorney
General Richard Blumenthal has observed that it is helpful to have
California and New York as allies in global warming cases because
they are large states with "huge resources. '43 7 There can be conflicts
among states about which states will take the lead role in the
case, but sometimes those issues can be resolved by choosing the
state that has the strongest factual case. In Massachusetts, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts took the lead role in the case
because its long coastline presented the best factual case for
showing harm from global warming.4 38
433. See Kanner, supra note 344, at 113-14 (encouraging state AGs to hire private
attorneys on a contingency fee basis to reduce costs to the public).
434. See Roundtable, supra note 423, at 621-22 (remarks of Alabama Attorney General
William H. Pryor, Jr.) (discussing controversy about size of attorneys' fees and secrecy by
some state AGs in negotiating fees and hiring private attorneys in litigation challenging
marketing practices of the tobacco industry); see also Mark A. Behrens & Donald Kochan, Let
the Sunshine In: The Need for Open, Competitive Bidding in Government Retention of Private
Legal Services, PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP., Oct. 2, 2000, at 915. Some states have enacted
legislation to regulate the fees that the state attorney general may negotiate with private
lawyers. See, e.g., Kan. H.B. 2627 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 54-12-08.1 (1999); TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 404.097 (Vernon 1999); Roundtable, supra note 423, at 622 n.10.
435. See Roundtable, supra note 423, at 622-23 (remarks of Minnesota Attorney General
Humphrey).
436. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 12, 37-50 (discussing the trend since the 1980s for
state AGs to cooperate and collaborate in lawsuits); Meyer, supra note 424, at 903-07
(discussing cooperation of state AGs in tobacco litigation and other cases).
437. Symposium, supranote 423, at 346 (remarks of Connecticut Attorney General Richard
Blumenthal).
438. See Stevenson, supranote 3, at 12-13.
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There could be negative political or policy consequences from
parens patriae suits if state AGs abuse their authority by filing
frivolous or burdensome suits, although Rule 11 sanctions should
limit inappropriate actions.43 9 Of course, private parties sometimes
also file frivolous or burdensome suits, and thus state AGs are not
the only lawyers who might file questionable lawsuits. There is a
danger that state AGs will file lawsuits for political reasons because
state AGs are elected positions in forty-three states.440 Accordingly,
state AGs "are political figures with political agendas and political
aspirations [and] [t]heir litigation decisions often reflect their
political interests ....
"" Professor Cass observes, "It should come as
no surprise that eleven of the twelve attorneys general suing in
Mass. v. EPA were Democrats while the administration whose
policies they challenged was Republican."4 4' 2 By increasing the
importance of the state AGs, the easy availability of parens patriae
suits might lead to more political competition to become the state
AG and might make the office more partisan.44 3 Such political
competition might have positive impacts by improving the quality
of candidates, but also could have negative effects if sitting state
AGs file suits for political reasons, or if candidates pander for votes
by promising to file questionable suits if they are elected.4 44
Industries that are potential or actual defendants might get involved in AG elections to defeat candidates who might sue them or
to elect candidates who may be more favorable to their interests.44 5
Because special interests often have more incentive to lobby the
439. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (authorizing courts to impose sanctions against parties or
attorneys filing frivolous law suits). See generally HANS BADER, COMPARATIVE ENTERPRISE
INST., THE NATION'S Top TEN WORST STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 22 (Jan. 24, 2007), available
at http://www. cei.orglpdf/5719.pdf (criticizing ten state attorneys general for using "lawsuits
as a weapon by which to impose new regulations on the public"); infra note 452 and
accompanying text.
440. Stevenson, supra note 3, at 10; Meyer, supra note 424, at 895-96 (arguing that state
AGs may alter decisions to increase opportunities for higher office).
441. Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA. The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 93
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 75, 78-79 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.orglinbrief/
2007/05/21/cass.pdf.
442. Id. at 79.
443. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 10-12.
444. See id. at 10-12, 40-41, 46 n.233.
445. See Kanner, supra note 344, at 114 (observing that a new AG may drop a lawsuit it
disagrees with); Stevenson, supranote 3, at 42 (predicting more "lobbyist efforts focused on
these national policy issues ...
at the state AG's office").
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government than average citizens, there is a possibility that states
or state AGs will file suits that serve those interests more than the
interests of the state's citizens. 446 Additionally, in some circumstances, a group of some state AGs may be able to reach a national
settlement with a particular industry or set of defendants that does
not reflect the will of citizens in other states.447
Conversely, there are reasons to believe that state AGs will
generally use their authority to file parens patriae suits in a
responsible way. State AGs must respond to a broad range of
constituents and therefore have an incentive to serve the public
interest. 448 There could be some public benefits from increased
public discussion of important national policy issues if candidates
for the AG position address potential areas of litigation that they
plan to bring if they are elected. 449 The increased importance of the
state AG position could bring stronger candidates for that office.450
Because lawsuits often last for many years and outlast the term of
a particular state AG, career civil servants, including attorneys in
the AG's office, might be able, in some circumstances, to influence
their politically elected superior to maintain suits that a new AG
might not have filed in the first instance. 451 Finally, the federal
courts can dismiss frivolous suits and even impose sanctions under
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if a state AG files an

446. See generally Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing four competing theories of
whether government bureaucracies act on behalf of public interest, special interests, or
government employees' self-interests, and concluding, "regulatory outcomes ameliorate
market failures and vindicate the citizenry's interests ... more commonly than other scholars
of regulation acknowledge .... "); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987) (discussing "public choice" theory that postulates
that special interest groups will have greater incentive to lobby and influence legislative
actions, and arguing that legislatures act on behalf of public interest more often than public
choice theory would predict); Sean Gailmard, Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic
Discretion, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 536, 537 (2002) (discussing the problem of bureaucracies
acting contrary to legislative intent); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory
Capture,PublicInterest, and the PublicAgenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167,
169 (1990) (discussing theory that special interests can "capture" regulatory agencies).
447. Meyer, supranote 424, at 886-87, 909-14.
448. See Stevenson, supra note 3, at 14.
449. Id. at 12.
450. Id. at 41-43.
451. Kanner, supra note 344, at 114.
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abusive parens patriae action.4" 2 Thus, most parens patriae suits
should serve the public interest.
CONCLUSION

The Massachusetts decision announced a new rule of law that
gives states preferential standing when they sue to protect their
quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare of their citizens
or the state's natural resources.4 53 Yet this new rule has a sound
basis in the Court's parens patriae decisions, even though those
cases generally do not explicitly address standing issues.4"4 Because
quasi-sovereign interests normally involve generalized grievances
applicable to large numbers of people or to extensive natural
resources, courts should not require states to demonstrate the type
of particularized injuries that private plaintiffs are required to
demonstrate for standing.455 For example, both the Missouri and
Tennessee Copper cases were public nuisance suits addressing
generalized injuries to large numbers of people or territories, but
the Court in those cases did not require the plaintiff state to show
that it had an individual injury because quasi-sovereign interests
are different in kind from individual rights.45 6 Accordingly,
Massachusetts appropriately relied on the Court's parens patriae
decisions as the grounds for giving states greater standing rights
when they sue on behalf of quasi-sovereign interests, although none
452. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c) (authorizing courts to impose sanctions against parties or
attorneys filing frivolous law suits); Derechin v. State Univ. of N.Y., 963 F.2d 513, 519-20 (2d
Cir. 1992) (affirming district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against New York State
Assistant Attorney General and order prohibiting the lawyer from receiving indemnification
available under New York law); Henderson v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 901 F.2d 1288,
1296-97 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against
Louisiana State Assistant Attorney General). But see Connecticut v. Borjorquez, 967 F.2d
1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1992) (vacating district court's order reprimanding Arizona State
Assistant Attorney General under Rule 11 for filing a frivolous motion because the district
court abused its discretion, and because appellant's motion was soundly based in fact and law,
and was not filed for the purpose of delay); Gilmore v. Finn, 259 Va. 448, 527 S.E.2d 426
(2000) (reversing as abuse of discretion the trial court's award of attorney's fees and sanctions
against the Governor of Virginia for filing suit in a right-to-die case because the Governor's
suit was not baseless or frivolous-rejecting trial court's findings to that effect).
453. See supra Part III.A.2.
454. See supra Part IV.G.
455. See supraPart I.B.
456. See supraPart IV.B.
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of those earlier cases had explicitly applied a different standing test
for states.457
A serious weakness of the Massachusetts decision is that it fails
to define to what extent and under what circumstances federal
courts should apply more relaxed standing requirements for
states. 458 The Missouri and Tennessee Copper decisions provide
helpful insights about how modern courts should address standing
issues in parens patriae cases, even though neither case was about
standing. The Missouri decision considered the future health
impacts of the water pollution in that case and, by analogy, supports
relaxing the immediacy requirement of standing so that, for
example, Massachusetts should be able to include projections
from computer models about the effects of global warming on its
coastline through 2100.4"9The Tennessee Copperdecision gave states

equitable remedies that were unavailable to private litigants and
did not require Georgia to explain the precise impacts of injunctive
relief. 460 By analogy, Tennessee Copper supports relaxing the
redressability requirements for states so that, for example,
Massachusetts does not have to prove how much the EPA's
regulation of new vehicle emissions would reduce future harms to
its coastline, as long as it is likely that such regulation would reduce
the harm to the state.4 1
Similar to procedural rights cases, the Supreme Court should
apply more lenient immediacy and redressability requirements
when states sue to protect quasi-sovereign interests.462 Thus, even
if Professor Adler is correct that the MassachusettsCourt was wrong
when it applied the footnote seven analysis to a case that ultimately
required a substantive decision by the EPA, the Court was right to
apply more relaxed immediacy and redressability requirements
because Massachusetts was protecting its quasi-sovereign interest

457. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
458. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1466 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("It
is not at all clear how the Court's 'special solicitude' for Massachusetts plays out in the
standing analysis, except as an implicit concession that petitioners cannot establish standing
on traditional terms.").
459. See supra notes 405-06 and accompanying text.
460. See supra notes 409-12 and accompanying text.
461. See supra notes 343-47 and accompanying text.
462. See supra Part I.C.
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in its coastline.4 63 The Akins decision suggests an appropriate outer
limit to parens patriae cases and special solicitude for state
standing by requiring proof of some type of concrete injury when a
plaintiff seeks relief for generalized injuries that apply to the public
at large. 464 Because the loss of Massachusetts' coastline is far from
trivial and the proposed remedy of limiting emissions from new U.S.
vehicles would reduce the amount of harm, the Court appropriately
granted standing to Massachusetts.4 65

463. See supraPart III.C.2.
464. See supraPart I.B.
465. See supraPart III.C.3.

